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THE INVESTMENT-RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
PETER K YU*
This Article critically examines the investment-related aspects of intellectual
property rights with a focus on the use of investor-state dispute settlement
(ISDS) to address international disputes involving intellectual property
investments. It begins by exploring the growing trend of using investment law
and fora to set international intellectual property norms. It also closely
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the ISDS mechanism. This Article
then examines the various upgrades that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
Agreement has provided to the ISDS mechanism. It further outlines the
conceptual and institutional improvements that could make ISDS even better
than the mechanism provided in the TPP Agreement. This Article concludes
by exploring whether the TPP ISDS mechanism has provided any silver linings
if it is adopted without modification.
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INTRODUCTION
Three decades ago, the United States and other contracting parties
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) launched the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations ("Uruguay
Round") to develop new international norms concerning the trade-
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INVESTMENT-RELATED ASPECTS OF IP RIGHTS
related aspects of intellectual property rights.' These norms eventually
became the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights2 ("TRIPS Agreement"). This oft-criticized agreement
not only transformed the international intellectual property landscape
but also necessitated a revision-and for many countries, a complete
overhaul-of the domestic intellectual property system. It is therefore
no surprise that some leading commentators have described the TRIPS
Agreement as a "sea change" or "tectonic shift" in international
intellectual property law and policy.'
Today, we are at a similar crossroads. Through bilateral, regional,
and plurilateral trade and investment agreements, new norms are
being developed to address the investment-related aspects of
intellectual property rights.' Even more importantly, these norms
will strengthen the ability of private investors, such as intellectual
property rights holders, to sue foreign governments without the
support of their home governments.' One therefore cannot help but
wonder whether we are now approaching yet another "sea change" or
"tectonic shift" in international intellectual property law and policy.
In the past few years, the developments concerning the investment-
related aspects of intellectual property rights have garnered
considerable policy, scholarly, and media attention. Frequently
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Ministerial Declaration on the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations of 20 Sept. 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623,
1626 (1986).
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
3. FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN
INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 3 (2007) (stating that "the TRIPS Agreement
represented a sea change in the international regulation of IPRs [intellectual
property rights]"); Charles R. McManis, Teaching Current Trends and Future
Developments in Intellectual Property, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 855, 856 (2008) (noting that
"the field of international intellectual property law underwent a tectonic shift with
the promulgation of the [TRIPS Agreement]"); see also JAYASHREE WATAL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (2001)
("TRIPS is, by far, the most wide-ranging and far reaching international treaty on the
subject of intellectual property to date and marks the most important milestone in
the development of international law in this area.").
4. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, The Non-Multilateral Approach to International Intellectual
Property Normsetting, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 83, 110-12 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2015) [hereinafter Yu,
Non-Multilateral Approach] (discussing the investment-related aspects of intellectual
property rights).
5. See discussion infra Section II.A.
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criticized is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),' whose agreement
the United States and its eleven trading partners in the Asia-Pacific
region signed on February 4, 2016.' The TPP investment chapter
and its attendant investor-state dispute settlement ("ISDS")
mechanism have generated quite a controversy, as this mechanism
will allow private investors to resolve international disputes with host
states concerning all forms of investments, including those in the
intellectual property field.'
Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) is among the most vociferous
critics of ISDS, which she condemned for giving large multinational
corporations "the right to challenge laws they don't like-not in
court, but in front of industry-friendly arbitration panels that sit
outside any court system."' In the run-up to last year's presidential
election, the candidates from both the Democratic and Republican
Parties also offered similarly harsh criticisms. While Hillary Clinton
described ISDS as "flawed" and called for "a new paradigm for trade
agreements that doesn't give special rights to corporations, but not to
workers and NGOs,"" Donald Trump made his opposition loud and
clear by lambasting the TPP as "another disaster, done and pushed by
special interests who want to rape our country."n Upon taking office,
President Trump quickly followed through by signing a presidential
memorandum that directed the United States Trade Representative
6. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016 [hereinafter TPP
Agreement], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific
-partnership/tpp-full-text.
7. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Trans-Pacific Partnership
Ministers' Statement (Feb. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministers'
Statement], https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/20
16/February/TPP-Ministers-Statement. The twelve TPP partners are Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. Peter IL Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific
Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1129, 1129 (2014).
8. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.1 (defining "investment" to include
"intellectual property rights").
9. Deirdre Fulton, As Countries Line up to Sign Toxic Deal, Warren Leads Call to
Reject TPP, COMMONDREAMS (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.commondreams.org/news/2
016/02/03/countries-line-sign-toxic-deal-warren-leads-call-reject-tpp.
10. Press Release, Oregon Fair Trade Campaign, Clinton and Sanders Oppose
"Lame Duck" Vote on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (May 6, 2016),
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/oregon/2016/05/05/clinton-and-sanders-oppose-
lame-duck-tpp-vote.
11. Jessica Hopper & Ines de la Cuetara, Donald Trump Slams Trans-Pacific
Partnership as "A Continuing Rape of Our Country," ABC NEWS (June 29, 2016, 7:17
AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-slams-trans-pacific-partnership-
continuing-rape/story?id=40213090.
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"to provide written notification to the Parties and to the Depository of
the TPP ... that the United States withdraws as a signatory of the TPP
and withdraws from the TPP negotiating process."12
Apart from the TPP Agreement and its ISDS mechanism,
intellectual property-related investor-state disputes involving Philip
Morris have also received significant attention. Since February 2010, this
multinational corporate giant began challenging the plain-packaging
regulations for tobacco products in Uruguay13 and Australia." Both
efforts have since failed." From March 2012 to September 2013,
Ukraine, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Indonesia also
filed complaints challenging the tobacco control measures in Australia
before the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization
(WTO)." These ongoing cases have since been consolidated," and the
WTO panel plans to issue its decision later this year.' 8
12. White House, Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the
United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement (Jan.
23, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/23/presidential-
memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific.
13. Philip Morris Brands Sirl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/de
fault/files/case-documents/ita0343.pdf.
14. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl., UNCITRAL, PCA Case
No. 2012-12, Notice of Claim (June 22, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0664.pdf [hereinafter Philip Morris Asia's Notice of Claim].
15. Philip Morris Brands Sirl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Award, 1 235 (July 8, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw7417.pdf; Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl.,
PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 588 (Dec. 17,
2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7303-0.pdf.
16. Request for Consultations by Indonesia, Australia-Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS467/1 (Sept. 20,
2013); Request for Consultations by Cuba, Australia-Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS458/1 (May 7, 2013); Request for
Consultations by the Dominican Republic, Australia-Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS441/1 (July 23, 2012); Request for
Consultations by Honduras, Australia-Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks,
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS435/1 (Apr. 10, 2012); Request for
Consultations by Ukraine, Australia-Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc.
WI'/DS434/1 (Mar. 15, 2012). Ukraine requested the WTO panel to suspend its panel
proceedings on May 28, 2015. See Communication from the Chairperson of the Panel,
Australia-Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS434/1 (June 3, 2015).
2017] 83
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Another widely reported ISDS dispute that has yet to be decided is
Eli Lilly's high-profile CDN$500 million complaint" against Canada
under chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) .20 This case concerned the Canadian courts' invalidation of
Eli Lilly's patents on the hyperactivity drug Strattera and the anti-
psychotic drug Zyprexa.2 1 The multinational pharmaceutical giant
claims that the "promise doctrine, "22 which the courts used to
invalidate its patents is inconsistent with Canada's obligations under
NAFTA, the TRIPS Agreement, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty."
17. See Communication from the Panel, Australia-Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Docs. WT/DS434/12, WT/DS435/17
WT/DS441/16, WT/DS458/15, WT/DS467/16 (Apr. 28, 2014) ("The Director-
General will compose the panels in DS434, DS435, DS441, DS458 and DS467 on 5
May 2014, and the same panelists will be appointed in all these disputes, pursuant to
Article 9.3 of the DSU [Dispute Settlement Understanding].").
18. See Communication from the Panel, Australia-Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS467/21 (Dec. 6, 2016) ("The Panel
wishes to advise that it now expects to issue its final report to the parties not before
May 2017, in light of the complexity of the legal and factual issues that arise in this
dispute."). For an early analysis of this dispute, see generally LUKAS VANHONNAEKER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS: FROM COLLISION TO
COLLABORATION 200-20 (2015); Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and
the Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1149 (2013).
19. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Government of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice
of Arbitration, 11 3, 85 (Sept. 12, 2013), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidb
lobs/onlineawards/c3544/dc4612_En.pdf.
20. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
21. Eli Lilly & Co., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 1 4.
22. As Cynthia Ho explained,
Since 2005, Canadian courts have invalidated roughly a dozen patents for
failing to satisfy this doctrine. Pursuant to this doctrine, a patent that
promises something is only useful if it does what it "promises." If the patent
does not make a promise, a scintilla of utility can establish usefulness. For
patents and patent applications that make a promise, whether the promise is
fulfilled can either be demonstrated in the patent or "soundly predicted." In
the many cases where the promise relies on a sound prediction, there are
three components to satisfy. First, there must a be [sic] factual basis for the
prediction. Tested compounds can supply this. Second, the inventor must
have a sound basis from which the desired result can be inferred from the
factual basis as of the date of the application. Third, there must be proper
disclosure in the patent application to justify the quid pro quo of a patent
monopoly.
Cynthia M. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege. Corporate Challenges to Domestic Intellectual
Property Decisions, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 236-37 (2015).
23. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
834 [Vol. 66:829
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The breach of these obligations has, in turn, prevented Eli Lilly from
meeting its reasonable investment-backed expectations.
Taken together, these developments have created a general
impression that investment law has now rudely entered the
intellectual property domain. Such an intrusion is important because
ISDS arbitrations involving intellectual property disputes represent
"not only a new frontier in investment arbitration, but more
importantly, uncharted territory in the increasingly complex and
contested landscape of international intellectual property
obligations."2 ' There has also been a growing concern about an
ongoing shift of intellectual property norm-setting activities from the
trade regime to the investment regime. Such a shift could take away
the traditional limitations, safeguards, and flexibilities that have been
built into the international intellectual property regime.2 7
To a large extent, the current debate on the investment-related
aspects of intellectual property rights has raised similarly far-reaching
questions as the intellectual property debate at the launch of the
Uruguay Round three decades ago. These questions are particularly
troubling considering the higher level of intellectual property
protection and enforcement now demanded by bilateral, regional,
and plurilateral trade and investment agreements. The TPP
Agreement, for instance, has called for intellectual property term
extension, special provisions for internet service providers, expansion
of eligibility for trademark rights, and greater protection of trade
secrets and clinical trial data.
Against this backdrop, this Article critically examines the
investment-related aspects of intellectual property rights with a focus
on the use of ISDS to address international disputes involving
intellectual property investments. Part I explores the growing trend
24. Eli Lilly & Co., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 11 3-4.
25. Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the
International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1121, 1122 (2014)
[hereinafter Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"J.
26. See, e.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset:
How International Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT'L L. 557,
566 (2015) ("While TRIPS laid the platform for commodification, much of the
current regime shifting is reconceptualizing IP [intellectual property] as an asset and
progressively detaching it from its grounding in incentive-based principles."); James
Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Law Making and Enforcement from the WTO to
the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L. ScI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017)
(discussing the shift from the intellectual property regime to the investment regime).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 125-26.
28. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, ch. 18.
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of using investment law and fora to set international intellectual
property norms. Although this Part recognizes the existence of many
new developments concerning the intellectual property rights
holders' use of ISDS, it notes that intellectual property has been
linked to foreign investment as early as the 1960s. This Part therefore
cautions against treating the linkage between intellectual property
and investment as a mostly recent development.
Part II closely evaluates the ISDS mechanism. This Part begins by
discussing its strengths in relation to investments in developing
countries, including those in the intellectual property field. It then
catalogues the mechanism's myriad weaknesses. To help facilitate a
systematic analysis, this Part divides these weaknesses into three
distinct categories: process-related, interpretation-related, and
outcome-related. It then discusses each weakness in turn.
Part III examines the various upgrades that the TPP Agreement has
provided to the ISDS mechanism. Although ISDS is available in
other agreements, such as NAFTA," this Part focuses on the specific
arrangements in the TPP for three reasons. First, such a focus will
reveal what concrete measures can be instituted to improve ISDS.
Although this Part finds that the TPP Agreement has not alleviated
many of the weaknesses documented in Section II.B, it welcomes the
various substantive and procedural safeguards that have been built into
the Agreement. Second, the discussion aims to illuminate the debate
on whether countries such as the United States should ratify the TPP
Agreement. After all, ISDS remains one of the Agreement's most
controversial features. Even though the Trump administration has
already announced the United States' withdrawal from the TPP, ISDS
is likely to remain a highly sensitive issue for future international trade
or investment agreements. Third, the compromise reached in the TPP
Agreement reflects the complex considerations precipitated by the
groundbreaking ISDS complaints Philip Morris and Eli Lilly filed in
the middle of the negotiations. The added safeguards not only
highlight the concerns of many TPP partners but also provide useful
suggestions on how to further improve ISDS.
Taking account of the various safeguards the TPP Agreement now
contains, Part IV outlines two different sets of improvements that
could make ISDS even better than the mechanism provided in the
TPP Agreement. The first set of improvements focuses on ways to
better conceptualize intellectual property investments. The second
set of improvements covers institutional arrangements that could
29. See NAFTA, supra note 20, arts. 1115-1120 (providing an ISDS mechanism).
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strengthen the overall ISDS mechanism. While many of these
improvements can be introduced without modifying the TPP
Agreement, others may require at least some modification.
Part V concludes by exploring whether the TPP ISDS mechanism
has provided any silver linings if it is adopted without modification.
Such an exploration will provide important guidance to developing
countries, considering that many of these countries lack the ability to
resist the introduction of ISDS through international trade or
investment agreements. Even if the TPP Agreement failed in the wake
of the United States' withdrawal, TPP-like ISDS mechanisms would still
be introduced to these countries through other bilateral, regional, or
plurilateral trade or investment agreements. Thus, developing
countries should consider the benefits and drawbacks of TPP-like ISDS
mechanisms as well as the various safeguards that can be proactively
introduced to reduce the mechanisms' deleterious impacts.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INVESTMENT
With the arrival of lengthy investment chapters in the TPP
Agreement and other international trade or investment agreements as
well as the unprecedented ISDS proceedings initiated by Philip Morris
and Eli Lilly, there is an inevitable assumption that investment law has
only recently entered the intellectual property domain. This view,
however, is not historically accurate. The linkage between intellectual
property and investment can be traced back many decades. Indeed,
the 1960s was the first time when these two sets of issues received
considerable international policy and scholarly attention.
On the investment front, it is worth recalling that Pakistan and
West Germany signed the first bilateral investment treaty in 1959.o
Many commentators have traced the origin of recent bilateral,
regional, and plurilateral investment agreements back to this
particular treaty." In addition, the Convention on the Settlement of
30. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Ger.-Pak., Nov. 25,
1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 6575; see also Chester Brown, The Evolution of the Regime of
International Investment Agreements: History, Economics and Politics, in INTERNATIONAL
INvEsTMENT LAw: A HANDBOOK 153, 177-79 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2015)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INvESTMENT IAw HANDBOOK] (discussing the agreement).
31. See, e.g., ScoTr MILLER & GREGORY N. HIcls, INvESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: A REALITY CHECK 6 (2015), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy-files/files/publication/1 50116_MillerInvestorStateDisputeWeb.pdf
(noting that the era of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) began in 1959); Bryan
Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights in International
Investment Agreements, 15 J. INT'L ECON. L. 871, 874 n.8 (2012) [hereinafter Mercurio,
Awakening the Sleeping Giant] (referring to the agreement as the "the first BIT");
8372017]
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Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
("ICSID Convention") was adopted in March 1965.12 As Tagi Sagafi-
nejad andJohn Dunning reminded us,
The period from 1945 to the 1960s can be called the golden era of
foreign direct investment [FDI]. During this phase, FDI grew
dramatically both in volume and in spread. The number of foreign
affiliates of U.S.-based [transnational corporations] grew from
around 7,400 in 1950 to 23,000 in 1966, with an annual growth rate
averaging near 10 percent. Meanwhile, outward flow of FDI from
the United States increased from $1.7 billion in 1960 to $4.4 billion
in 1970, while inward FDI into the United States from the rest of the
world went from $140 million in 1960 to $1 billion a decade later.3 3
It was in the 1960s when developing countries first sought to
"regulate foreign investment through an international instrument
rather than leaving the matter to customary international law."34
Since then, the global stock of FDI has greatly increased from $60
billion in 1960 to $25 trillion in 2013, as estimated by the World
Bank.3 ' Today, more than 3000 bilateral, regional, or plurilateral
investment agreements have been signed."
The 1960s was also the era when developing countries became
increasingly dissatisfied with the international intellectual property
regime. At that time, many newly independent countries seriously
questioned whether succeeding to obligations that the former
colonial powers entered into on their behalves was a good idea." As I
Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"?, supra note 25, at 1124 ("European countries
negotiated the first wave of BITs, starting with a Germany-Pakistan BIT in 1959.").
32. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159. This Convention is known widely as the ICSID Convention, drawing its
name from the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID).
33. TAGI SAGAFI-NEJAD & JOHN H. DUNNING, THE UN AND TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS: FROM CODE OF CONDUCT TO GLOBAL COMPACT 26 (2008).
34. SURVA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw: RECONCILING POLICY AND
PRINCIPLE 215 (2d ed. 2012).
35. MILLER & HICKS, supra note 31, at 6.
36. See Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 11, 2015) [hereinafter ISDS Fact Sheet], https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds
("Various forms of ISDS are now a part of over 3,000 agreements worldwide, of which
the United States is party to 50.").
37. See Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465,
471-75, 505-07 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Two Development Agendas].
38. Id. at 471.
838 [Vol. 66:829
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observed in relation to the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works" ("Berne Convention"),
When [this] Convention was revised in Brussels in 1948, only India
and Pakistan participated as fully independent nations. While
other less developed countries were previously subject to the Berne
provisions, the Convention applied to them only by virtue of their
status "as dependent territories." Once they became independent,
they therefore began to question the extant international copyright
relationship-in particular, whether they should continue as
members of the Berne Convention in their own right or whether
they should withdraw from the Union. While India, Pakistan, the
Philippines, and many former French and Belgian African colonies
elected to remain bound by the Convention, Indonesia decided to
withdraw from the Union.
It was against this post-colonial background that a large number of
pro-development documents or instruments were developed. The
widely cited examples included Brazil's draft 1961 resolution on "The
Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Under-Developed
Countries," the 1967 Stockholm Protocol to the Berne
Convention, the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, the draft International Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology," and the draft U.N. Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations.4 5
39. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at ParisJuly 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
40. Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 37, at 471-72 (footnotes omitted).
41. For discussions of this draft declaration, see generally Andrea Koury Menescal,
Changing WIPO's Ways? The 2004 Development Agenda in Historical Perspective, 8 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 761 (2005); Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 37, at 505-06.
42. Protocol Regarding Developing Countries to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 (revised at Stockholm July 14,
1967). For discussions of the Stockholm Protocol, see generally 1 SAM RICKETSON &
JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE
CONVENTION AND BEYOND 120-24 (2d ed. 2005); Charles F. Johnson, The Origins of the
Stockholm Protocol, 18 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 91 (1970); Dorothy M. Schrader,
Analysis of the Protocol Regarding Developing Countries, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A.
160 (1970); Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 37, at 471-84.
43. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201, at 527, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974), 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974).
44. Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/47
(1985), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD],
COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ON TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY:
SELECTED INSTRUMENTS 261-77 (2001), http://unctad.org/en/docs/psiteipcm5.en.pdf;
see also Peter K. Yu, International Technology Contracts, Restrictive Covenants and the
2017] 839
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Although pro-development activities slowed down significantly in
the late 1970s and the 1980s, due in large part to the developing
countries' weakening economic power"6 and the developed countries'
active push for the Uruguay Round negotiations, 7 renewed attention
was paid to the linkage between intellectual property and investment
following the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement."8 Such attention
grew even further with the expiration of the TRIPS transition periods
for developing countries on January 1, 2000,49 and the developed
countries' active negotiation of TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade agreements.o
In the mid-2000s, around the time when these negotiations
accelerated, a growing number of academic commentators began
discussing international intellectual property law in the investment
context. For instance, Peter Drahos explored the relationship
between bilateral investment treaties and bilateral intellectual
UNCTAD Code, in EMPLOYEES, TRADE SECRETS AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 41
(Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2017) (discussing the draft
International Code of Conduct in relation to international technology contracts and
employee-related restrictive covenants); Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 37, at
493-505 (providing a historical discussion of the draft International Code of Conduct).
45. See Karl P. Sauvant, The Negotiations of the United Nations Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations: Experience and Lessons Learned, 16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE
11, 13-20 (2015).
46. See SAGAFI-NEJAD & DUNNING, supra note 33, at 29 (noting that the early 1980s
"reflected a weakening of the position of developing countries as debt rose and the
Bretton Woods institutions imposed adjustment policies").
47. For discussions of the active push by developed countries and their industries
for the TRIPS Agreement, see generally DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRIPs AGREEMENT (2002); SUSAN K SELL,
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
96-120 (2003).
48. This renewed attention is understandable considering that developing
countries have been made aware of the benefits of stronger intellectual property
protection in attracting foreign investment and "were told to overlook the distasteful
aspects of introducing or increasing intellectual property protection and
enforcement in exchange for longer-term economic health." Daniel J. Gervais, The
TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and Impact on Economic Development, in 4
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 23, 43 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
49. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 65 (providing a five-year transition
period for developing countries).
50. See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property
Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 323, 392-400 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrents] (discussing the increased negotiation of bilateral and regional trade
agreements).
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property agreements." Carlos Correa analyzed the implications of
international investment agreements for the grant of compulsory
licenses. 2  Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng detailed the public interest
implications of TRIPS-plus international investment agreements. 53
Frederick Abbott underscored the investment angle that drove the
global pharmaceutical industry's push for stronger patent protection
worldwide. As he reminded us,
A patent is essentially a financial instrument that entitles its bearer
to achieve greater than competitive market rates of return on
investment. The Pharma companies are market-oriented
enterprises that seek to maximize shareholder returns on
investment. Pharma treats potential intrusion on the security of
the patent and related regulatory support as a threat to return on
investment. Pharma justifies its rent seeking as necessary to the
funding of research and development for new medicines.... The
Pharma companies demand rules and enforcement that will
protect their income streams, justifying a high return on
investment as necessary to drug development.5 5
Like these commentators, I registered my concern about an
emerging "incentive-investment divide" among policymakers who
were responsible for developing intellectual property regimes.5 6
While policymakers in developed countries were obsessed with the
protection of the investments made by their exporting intellectual
51. Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001).
52. Carlos M. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements:
Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 331 (2004)
[hereinafter Correa, Investment Protection].
53. Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng, IP Rights Under Investment Agreements: The TRIPS-
Plus Implications for Enforcement and Protection of Public Interest (South Centre, Research
Paper No. 8, 2006).
54. Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and Trends
in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27, 36 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter
NEGOTIATING HEALTH].
55. Id.
56. See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 892-901
(2007) [hereinafter Yu, International Enclosure Movement]; see also Peter IL Yu, The
Strategic and Discursive Contributions of the Max Planck Principles for Intellectual Property
Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 62 DRAKE L. REv. DISCOURSE 20, 30
(2014) (stating that "the negotiation of intellectual property provisions in [bilateral
and regional agreements] should not take on a heavy gloss of trade, investment, or
security" (emphasis added)).
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property industries," their developing country counterparts were
equally obsessed with international compliance and the acquisition of
foreign investments." In the end, the policyrnakers on both sides
focused so much on investments that they ignored a primary
justification for intellectual property protection-that is, to provide
incentives for creativity and innovation. Such a focus is dangerous
from a public interest standpoint. As I noted earlier,
When policymakers and trade negotiators focus on the protection
of intellectual property investments by their own nationals, they will
likely be less interested in evaluating the economic efficiency of the
intellectual property system and the welfare gains that system
produces. Instead, they will push for the development of a system
that protects foreign investors[,] often at the expense of the public
interest. . . , the local innovative environment and the country's
social-economic conditions.59
Given the decade-long existence of this body of literature, the
discussion of intellectual property issues in the investment context is
clearly not as new as many commentators have suggested. To a large
extent, the discussion of the investment-related aspects of intellectual
property rights is only as "new" as the discussion of the trade-related
aspects of these rights in the late 1980s and the early 1990s."o Although
57. For discussions of the relationship between intellectual property protection
and foreign direct investment (FDI), see generally Keith E. Maskus, The Role of
Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9
DUKE J. CoMp. & INT'L L. 109 (1998) [hereinafter Maskus, Role of Intellectual Property
Rights]; Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual
Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 163 (1998).
58. See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND
THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
242 (2009) ("TRIPS implementation in the OAPI [African Intellectual Property
Organization] countries was shaped by a pro-IP and 'compliance-plus'-oriented
political environment."); Keith E. Maskus &Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of
Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME 3, 18 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005)
(expressing concern that many developing countries are "compliance oriented").
59. Yu, Non-Multilateral Approach, supra note 4, at 112.
60. Timothy Armstrong recently provided the following observation:
Given the Berne Convention and the very lengthy history of international
negotiations over copyright. . . , [one] might very well conclude that it was
entirely foreseeable, even inevitable, that copyright would come to be a
contentious trade issue as global markets for the import and export of
expressive works matured. Perhaps it was not inevitable that the United
States would yoke copyright policy to the WTO trading system via the TRIPS
Agreement, thereby enabling bigger countries to threaten smaller ones with
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the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property"1 ("Paris
Convention") and the Berne Convention were established to address
the growing needs for international standards governing the cross-
border trade of intellectual property goods," trade rules were not
applied to the intellectual property context until the completion of the
Uruguay Round and the founding of the WTO."
The same can be said about today's growing use of investment law in
the intellectual property field. As noted earlier, policymakers in both
developed and developing countries have, for many decades, viewed
technology and intellectual property through the investment lens.
Indeed, the ISDS mechanism that Eli Lilly has utilized to challenge the
Canadian "promise doctrine" was instituted by NAFTA more than two
decades ago." The only new development was that private intellectual
property investors, such as Philip Morris and Eli Lilly, have now begun
using ISDS to resolve international intellectual property disputes and
to shape international intellectual property norms."
Until the early 2010s, there were in effect only two general types of
international processes for resolving cross-border intellectual property
disputes. The first type involves the International Court of Justice."
Both the Paris and Berne Conventions provide this process as an
optional dispute settlement mechanism. 7 Yet no country has ever
trade sanctions if they did not bring their domestic copyright laws up to the
standards favored by the large copyright-exporting nations ....
Timothy K. Armstrong, Two Comparative Perspectives on Copyright's Past and Future in the
Digital Age, 15J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 698, 759 (2016).
61. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
62. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 50, at 333-34 (noting that
international intellectual property protection did not become a major issue until
transportation and communication had substantially improved and until cross-
border markets had greatly expanded).
63. See id. at 357-66 (discussing the marriage of intellectual property to trade
through the TRIPS Agreement).
64. See NAFTA, supra note 20, arts. 1115-1120 (providing a mechanism for
settling disputes between a party and an investor of another party).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 13-24.
66. See International Court of justice, HAGUE JUST. PORTAL,
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=305 (last visited Feb. 5, 2017)
("The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations.... The Court has a dual role: to settle in accordance with international
law the legal disputes submitted to it by States, and to give advisory opinions on legal
questions referred to it by duly authorised international organs and agencies.").
67. See Berne Convention, supra note 39, art. 33(1) ("Any dispute between two or
more countries of the Union concerning the interpretation or application of this
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used it to resolve any international intellectual property dispute."8 The
second type involves trade agreements, such as NAFTA and the WTO
Agreement.69 Although successful dispute settlement through these
agreements will undoubtedly benefit intellectual property industries,
the WTO's state-to-state dispute settlement process does not give
private actors legal standing to sue national governments." As a result,
these industries will have to rely on the assistance of governments in
either their home states or other supportive states.
In sum, what is new about the investment-related aspects of
intellectual property rights is not that intellectual property rights
have now been viewed or treated as investments-which has
happened for many decades. Nor is it that ISDS mechanisms have
now emerged to enable private investors to sue national
governments-as NAFTA and other bilateral and regional investment
agreements have already empowered them to do so. Rather, it is the
beginning of the private investors' effort to take intellectual property
norm-setting activities into their own hands by initiating ISDS
proceedings against those foreign governments that do not offer
their preferred levels of protection and enforcement. These efforts
were unprecedented in the intellectual property field.
II. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Thus far, policymakers, commentators, and civil society
organizations have widely criticized the use of ISDS to resolve
international intellectual property disputes.' While policymakers
and commentators in developing countries are understandably
concerned about the heavy burden imposed by this increasingly used
Convention, not settled by negotiation, may, by any one of the countries concerned,
be brought before the International Court of Justice by application in conformity
with the Statute of the Court, unless the countries concerned agree on some other
method of settlement."); Paris Convention, supra note 61, art. 28(1) (containing the
same language as in the Berne Convention).
68. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 50, at 355 ("So far, no member
state of the Berne or Paris Unions has ever pursued intellectual property litigation
before the [International Court ofJustice].").
69. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 64 (mandating that disputes arising
under the TRIPS Agreement be settled by the WTO dispute settlement process).
70. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes arts. 2-3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 401-02 [hereinafter DSU] (outlining the
dispute settlement process and limiting access to WTO member states).
71. See sources cited infra note 332.
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mechanism, their counterparts in the developed world are equally
concerned about the mechanism's potential impact on their ability to
regulate harmful conducts, including those committed by
transnational corporations.7 ' To provide an understanding of the full
impact of ISDS, this Part explores in turn the mechanism's myriad
strengths and weaknesses.
A. Strengths
1. General strengths
ISDS is particularly attractive to businesses entering countries that
have either a limited respect for the rule of law or an
underdeveloped, or even undeveloped, judicial system. While
72. See MILLER & HIcKS, supra note 31, at 6 ("According to [UNCTAD], about 100
claims were initiated during the 15-year period 1987-2002, but from 2003 until 2013,
the number of filed claims more than quadrupled, reaching a total of 568."); Ho,
supra note 22, at 219 (" [I] nvestors filed only one dispute in 1982, over fifty new cases
in 2012, and today there are currently five hundred claims pending in over fifty
countries."); see also ANNA JOUBIN-BRET, ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY
CENTRE ON INVESTMENT DISPUTES? 2 (2015) ("It should be noted that the number of
cases compiled by UNCTAD does not reflect all disputes between foreign investors
and states. With the increase of transparency in several arbitration institutions and
treaties, the number of treaty-based cases is easier to access. However, a host of cases
brought under investment contracts or before the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) or regional arbitration institutions are not publicly known, and it is
fair to say that the total number can easily be doubled."); Gary B. Born & Ethan G.
Shenkman, Confidentiality and Transparency in Commercial and Investor-State
International Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 5, 28 (Catherine
A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009) ("The UNCITRAL Rules ... provide for ad
hoc arbitration with no central registry or requirement that the existence of
UNCITRAL cases be publicly registered. For this reason, investors seeking to keep
their disputes with states out of the public eye may decide, treaty permitting, to opt
for an ad hoc arbitral mechanism rather than ICSID. Some non-trivial percentage of
investor-state arbitrations are thus never made public.").
73. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12; see also Ho, supra note 22, at 220 &
n.21 (noting the concerns among Australian and German policymakers about the
problems posed by ISDS).
74. As Charles Brower and Stephan Schill observed,
In many developing and transitioning countries, independent courts that
decide cases in accordance with pre-established rules of law in a timely
fashion are missing altogether. Corruption in the judiciary is a sad but daily
business in the courts of many countries. Additionally, lengthy and
inefficient court proceedings dragging on over years, if not decades, remain
too commonplace. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to argue
convincingly that dispute resolution in many host states' courts constitutes a
way for investors to make a recalcitrant host state comply with its investment-
treaty commitments.
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business or contractual disputes are inevitable, they are highly
problematic if injured investors cannot seek compensation through a
fair and independent judicial system. The lack of such a system
would make it difficult for businesses to recoup or benefit from their
investments, such as those made when "buying or leasing land,
building new facilities, establishing relationships, and recruiting and
training employees."" Having mechanisms that prevent foreign
investors from being subjected to unreasonable political risks would
also send important signals to attract investments from abroad."
In addition, providing an internationalized process for businesses to
seek redress directly from governments is important considering that
courts, especially those in developing countries, tend to be protective
of their own governments." For example, these courts may provide
Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI.J. INT'LL. 471, 479 (2009) (footnotes
omitted); see also MILLER & HICKS, supra note 31, at v ("Disputes are also most
frequent in states with weak legal institutions. Argentina (53 claims) and Venezuela
(36 claims) are the leading respondent states.").
75. MILLER & HicKs, supra note 31, at 13; see also Christoph Schreuer, Do We Need
Investment Arbitration?, in RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:
JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 879, 879 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds.,
2015) [hereinafter RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM] ("An investor typically must commit
considerable resources before it can hope to reap the expected profits. In doing so,
it makes itself dependent on the benevolence of the host State. This situation of
dependence calls for strong legal protection.").
76. See LONE WANDAHL MOUYAL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE RIGHT
TO REGULATE: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 8 (2016) (noting the political risks
concerning "the likelihood of changes to the operation and profitability of the
investment as a result of the policy or administration, which impacts on the existence
and/or an investor's ownership of the investment, on the continuous operation of
the investment as well as on the possibility of transfer of returns"); SUBEDI, supra note
34, at 87 (discussing the role of BITs as "insurance against political risks"); August
Reinisch, The Future of Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT IAW FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 894, 899 (Christina
Binder et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw] (stating that a
legal framework that includes the potential for highly enforceable investment awards
"creates a positive investment climate that attracts foreign investment that is
beneficial to the economy of recipient states"); Schreuer, supra note 75, at 879
("From the host State's perspective, the most obvious advantage of investment
protection is improvement of its investment climate."); Ho, supra note 22, at 231-32
("All of these rights help to ensure that host governments will not subject foreign
investors to inappropriate risks, and consequently induce them to invest.").
77. See Peter Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 3, 40 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008)
[hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK] ("[I]nvestors may perceive host country laws and
procedures not to be sufficient as a means for the resolution of disputes with the host
country. They may prefer an internationalized approach to dispute settlement. This
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sovereign immunity, thereby taking away the businesses' opportunities
to file lawsuits against local governments in the first place.7 ' The courts
may also be biased, 7  especially if corruption is involved.o For
businesses in locations with armed conflicts or civil strife, resolving
disputes through local means can be quite dangerous.81
allows the investor the freedom to choose between national and international
dispute settlement mechanisms.").
78. As Andrea Bjorklund observed,
Municipal courts in the home state of the investor will often be unavailable
either for lack of jurisdiction over the host state, or because foreign sovereign
immunity protects the host government. All the western European nations,
and many beyond, have adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,
holding that foreign governments do not enjoy immunity when they are acting
jure gestionis (in a private capacity), but that they retain immunity when acting
jure imperii (in a public capacity). The United States followed the lead of the
European countries and codified the restrictive theory of immunity in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. In the investor-state dispute
settlement context, foreign states sometimes act in a private capacity, but very
often act in a public capacity as they enact a government measure with
deleterious effects on a foreign investor or his investment.
Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public International Law: Why Competition
Among International Economic Law Tribunals Is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 254
(2007) (footnotes omitted); see also Brower & Schill, supra note 74, at 479 ("Various
legal obstacles-including state immunity and doctrines of judicial restraint such as
the act-of-state doctrine-constitute significant limits to the subjection of host states
to third-country jurisdiction."); Ho, supra note 22, at 232 ("Although foreign
investors previously might have attempted to sue the state in its own courts, those
courts could be biased; alternatively, the state might be able to claim sovereign
immunity. Sometimes the investor could not even directly pursue an action.").
79. As Christoph Schreuer elaborated,
From an investor's perspective, the alternative of resorting to a host State's
domestic courts is of limited attractiveness. Domestic courts are organs of
the State and judges are State employees. In arbitration, the appointment of
employees of one of the parties as arbitrators is taboo. There is no
persuasive argument why different standards should apply to domestic courts
in cases against forum States. Lack of independence and impartiality of
these courts and a sense of loyalty towards local interests are recurring
problems that arise for foreign investors that try to vindicate their rights
before domestic courts against the forum State.
Schreuer, supra note 75, at 883; see also ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36 ("While
countries with weak legal institutions are frequent respondents in ISDS cases,
American investors have also faced cases of bias or insufficient legal remedies in
countries with well-developed legal institutions.").
80. See Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler & Dorothee Gottwald, Corruption, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at 584 (examining the "legal effects of corruption on
international investment").
81. See MILLER & HIcKS, supra note 31, at 17-19 (discussing the change of
investment policy from gunboat diplomacy to BITs); Ho, supra note 22, at 232 ("In the
worst-case scenario, home states used, or at least threatened to use, military force.").
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At the macro level, ISDS can promote global harmony by
"insulat[ing these] disputes from the realm of politics and
diplomacy."82 As Christoph Schreuer, a leading commentator on the
ICSID Convention, pointed out,
A major benefit that is often overlooked is the impact on the relations
between the States concerned. Diplomatic protection by the investor's
State of nationality has been a frequent source of irritation and
discord. In the presence of an effective system of investor-State
arbitration, the host State and the investor's home State are less likely
to get drawn into investment disputes. Where investment arbitration
is available, these disputes are transferred from the political arena to a
judicial forum especially charged with the settlement of mixed
investor-State disputes. The dispute settlement process is depoliticized
and subjected to objective legal criteria.83
Diplomatic benefits aside, greater protection of investment-
through ISDS or otherwise-could help to ensure "the introduction
and promotion of principles of good governance in domestic legal
systems."" Indeed, according to Professor Schreuer, "Investment
protection treaties provide for the rule of law and its effective
implementation with respect to foreign investors. The relevant
standards have begun to show spill-over effects on the internal
systems of the countries concerned."8
Finally, it will be worthwhile to compare ISDS with state-to-state
dispute settlement. Compared with the process in the WTO, which
limits complaints to those brought by state governments," ISDS will
give investors independence and more control over the dispute
resolution strategies. The latter process will enable investors to
determine for themselves when to file complaints and whether to
focus on the short term or the long term.8 ' The ability to make these
82. Schreuer, supra note 75, at 882 (quoting Aron Broches, the chair of the
preparatory meetings for the ICSID Convention).
83. Id. at 881; see also VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 161 (stating that ISDS
arbitrators will be "able to issue a directly enforceable award holding the Host
Government accountable for [an international investment agreement] violation
without risking the political interferences that may occur in conflicts between
States"); Reinisch, supra note 76, at 900 (noting that ISDS "is supposed to lead to a
de-politicization of investment disputes").
84. Schreuer, supra note 75, at 882.
85. Id.
86. See supra text accompanying note 70.
87. See Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment
Arbitration: The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 357, 407-08
(2010) ("[T] he investor in an investor-state arbitration will have the greatest degree
of control over its case without any involvement from its own government. ... [It]
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decisions is particularly important because governments do not
always meet industry demands for initiating WTO complaints." As
Charles Gibson observed,
[I]nvestors choosing the WTO forum will be forced to rely upon
their government's willingness to bring a claim, which is not a
foregone conclusion and may be subject to the vagaries of other
considerations in the relations between the two countries concerned.
The private investor will thus need considerable political sway to
induce its government to initiate the state-to-state dispute.89
2. Strengths specific to intellectual property
In the intellectual property arena more specifically, ISDS can
provide some additional benefits. For instance, in cases in which the
government is complicit in acts of piracy or counterfeiting, investors
may be able to obtain compensation for their losses even if they
cannot stop the government from participating in these illegal
activities." Complicity in this area can range from the government's
direct participation in pirate and counterfeiting activities to its failure
to take the requisite actions for addressing these problems."1 As
Lukas Vanhonnaeker observed,
The involvement of the State can take different forms and does not
necessarily need to amount to positive actions on the part of the
state: the Host State can prove to be involved if it supported acts of
piracy but also if it failed despite its awareness of the situation at
stake to take the necessary measures to effectively restrict IPRs
[intellectual property rights] infringement.9 2
can prepare and implement its own strategy for litigating potential investment claims
in connection with the compulsory license based only on the investor's assessment of
the circumstances and merits of the case.").
88. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property
in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 923-26 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates
to Partners Il] (noting that the U.S. Trade Representative initially took a "'wait-and-
see' approach" and refused to file a WTO complaint against China despite repeated
complaints and demands from the business community).
89. Gibson, supra note 87, at 407 (footnotes omitted).
90. See VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 172-73 (describing the various claims
that an investor could make when a government chooses to "look[] the other way").
91. See id. at 173 ("[T]he investor will have to prove a failure of the state to act
with due diligence for the full protection and security claim and he will have to bring
evidence that the Host State's enforcement authorities deliberately did not take
appropriate action or were corrupt as far as the fair and equitable treatment claim is
concerned.").
92. Id. at 162.
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A difficult question, however, concerns whether inadequate
intellectual property enforcement could meet the burden of
government complicity. Such a question is particularly important
considering that developed country governments continue to have
great difficulty in using the WTO dispute settlement process to
strengthen intellectual property protection and enforcement in
developing countries."
While there are apparent benefits to using ISDS as an alternative
dispute resolution mechanism, it remains to be seen whether this
mechanism can be transformed into an "effective tool[] in pressuring
governments to strengthen their efforts to enforce intellectual
property rights."" At first glance, the claimants would likely face
considerable challenges in linking inadequate intellectual property
enforcement to the host government's failure" in providing "fair and
equitable treatment" or "full protection and security"-commitments
commonly made under international investment agreements. 6
Indeed, as Vanhonnaeker reminded us, "given the often weak IP
[(intellectual property] legal regime in many developing countries, in
which most acts of systemic IPRs piracy take place, investors will likely
93. The leading example of such difficulty is China-Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in which the United States
succeeded in some claims but failed in the others. See Panel Report, China-Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc.
WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) (finding for China on the claim regarding the high
thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties related to intellectual property
protection and for the United States on the claim regarding the denial of copyright
protection to works that have not been authorized for publication or dissemination,
with the remaining claim regarding the customs authorities' failure to properly
dispose of infringing goods seized at the border somewhat divided between the two
parties). For the Author's discussions of this dispute, see generally Peter K Yu,
TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 727 (2011); Peter
K Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046 (2011).
94. VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 161.
95. See id. at 162 ("[W]hile international investment law protects investors in
their relationship with the Host State (and its bodies), acts of piracy are usually
committed by private parties, thus not falling under the scope of [international
investment agreements] that only cover government interferences with investors'
proprietary rights.").
96. See, e.g., TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.6.1 ("Each Party shall accord to
covered investments treatment in accordance with applicable customary
international law principles, including fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security."); Giuditta Cordero Moss, Full Protection and Security, in
STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 131 (August Reinisch ed., 2008) (discussing
the standard of "full protection and security"); Katia Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard: Recent Developments, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION,
supra, at 111 (discussing the standard of "fair and equitable treatment").
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find it difficult to prove wrongdoing on the part of the State taking the
form of insufficient efforts in their fight against IP piracy."17
B. Weaknesses
Despite the myriad benefits of ISDS, there are many reasons why
this dispute settlement mechanism is undesirable and problematic,
especially when viewed from the developing countries' perspective.
To help facilitate a systematic analysis, this Section catalogues the
various weaknesses of ISDS, dividing them into three distinct
categories: process-related, interpretation-related, and outcome-
related. This Section then discusses each weakness in turn.
1. Process-based weaknesses
The current ISDS process has at least four types of weaknesses.
First, arbitration costs can be very high. In general, the costs "have
averaged over USD 8 million with costs exceeding USD 30 million in
some cases."" These costs could go up to as high as $70 million, as in
the highly unusual Yukos Oil case discussed in Section II.B.3."
Considering that each claim in a WTO dispute generally costs about
only $300,000 to $400,000 (based on 2004 figures),'00 the costs of ISDS
arbitrations are substantially higher.10 ' If developing countries already
97. VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 163.
98. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A
Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community 19 (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Working Papers on International Investment No.
2012/03, 2012); see also Matthew Hodgson, Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The
Case for Reform, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 748, 749 ("The
average Party Costs for Claimants and Respondents are in the region of U.S. $4.4
million and U.S. $4.5 million, respectively. To this can be added average Tribunal
Costs of around U.S. $750,000. The average 'all in' costs of an investment treaty
arbitration are therefore just short of U.S. $10 million. The median figure is notably
lower, but still substantial, at around U.S. $6 million." (footnotes omitted)).
99. See JOUBIN-BRET, supra note 72, at 2 (stating that the "the legal fees [in the
Yukos Oil case] for the claimant alone [were] US$70 million").
100. See Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who
Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J.
INT'L EcoN. L. 459, 473 (2004) (finding that "an average WTO claim costs in the
range of US$300,000-400,000 in attorneys' fees," based on 2004 figures); see also
Gregory Shaffer, Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Why It
Matters, the Barriers Posed, in TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT 167, 183-84 (James
C. Hartigan ed., 2009) (discussing the legal costs involved in WTO disputes).
101. See JOUBiN-BRET, supra note 72, at 2 ("Compared with cases brought to the
WTO [Dispute Settlement Body], ... investment treaty cases are within a range of 5
to 10 times more expensive than trade disputes.").
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have a difficult time affording the WTO dispute settlement process, the
exceedingly high costs of ISDS arbitrations will certainly guarantee that
most businesses in these countries will be shut out of the mechanism. 0 2
Second, ISDS arbitrators may be partial and unaccountable.0 o For
example, these arbitrators may have worked in law firms that have
clients in the same industry.' They may also have a tendency to
serve corporate clients who are similar to those filing ISDS
complaints.' Indeed, developing country policymakers, academic
and policy commentators, and civil society organizations often lament
102. Thus far, commentators have proposed various measures to address the high
costs of ISDS arbitrations. See, e.g., Hodgson, supra note 98 (discussing ways to
reform costs in investment treaty arbitration); Adam Raviv, Achieving a Faster ICSID, in
RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 653, 695-96 (offering as solutions "a
ceiling on fees for a specific matter" and "a hard time limit-say, six months--on
issuing an award" so as to prevent arbitrators from "drag[ging] out deliberations simply
to bill more time to the parties"); Jeffrey Sullivan & David Ingle, Interim Costs Orders:
The Tribunal's Tool to Encourage Procedural Economy, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra
note 75, at 731, 732 ("One procedural mechanism that may assist in preventing
procedural misconduct and unmeritorious claims is the use of interim costs orders. If
tribunals regularly used their case management powers to issue interim costs orders,
they would be able to deter nefarious tactics while also balancing the two seemingly
irreconcilable goals of due process and procedural economy.").
103. See Ho, supra note 22, at 234 ("Some also contend that arbitrators lack the
independence and impartiality of typical domestic or international tribunals."); Joost
Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment Arbitrators Are
from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus, 109 AM.J. INT'L L. 761, 783 (2015) ("[O]n
average, WTO panelists tend to be relatively low-key diplomats from developing
countries (very few U.S./EU nationals), with a government background, and often
without a law degree or legal expertise, whereas ICSID arbitrators are likely high-
powered, elite private lawyers or legal academics from western Europe or the United
States[.] [In addition,] the pool of ICSID arbitrators [is] an ideologically divided,
closed network with a small number of individuals attracting most nominations,
whereas the universe of WATO panelists is ideologically more homogeneous, with a
relatively low reappointment rate and nominations more evenly distributed (with the
consequence that panelists, on average, have relatively little experience) [.]").
104. Joost Pauwelyn recounted the frequent criticisms of ICSID arbitrators:
ICSID arbitrators ... get referred to as "elite lawyers," "ambitious investment
lawyer[s] keen to make a lucrative living," a "mafia," "super arbitrators" who
are "not just the mafia but a smaller, inner mafia," adjudicators-not
faceless-but with conflicts of interest and a "hidden agenda" ("one minute
acting as counsel, the next framing the issue as an academic, or influencing
policy as a government representative or expert witness").
Pauwelyn, supra note 103, at 780 (footnotes omitted); see also Gaukrodger & Gordon,
supra note 98, at 44 ("It appears that over 50% of ISDS arbitrators have acted as
counsel for investors in other ISDS cases while it has been estimated about 10% of
ISDS arbitrators have acted as counsel for States in other cases.").
105. See Pauwelyn, supra note 103, at 764 (noting "the closed network of specialist
ISDS arbitrators and lawyers" in "the terrain of subject-matter specialists").
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the process's bias toward the interests of transnational
corporations16 As President Evo Morales of Bolivia declared,
"Governments in Latin America and I think all over the world never
win the cases. The transnationals always win."1o7 These sentiments
are understandable considering that the majority of the claimants in
ISDS cases originated from developed countries."os
Third, many of the ISDS proceedings have been kept in secret, and
policymakers, commentators, and civil society organizations continue
to have great difficulty uncovering what happens in these
proceedings. 09 For instance, the notice of claim in Philip Morris
106. As Susan Franck observed,
In investment arbitration, there is a lurking concern that the development
status of arbitrators, particularly presiding arbitrators who wield especially
strong influence, may be inappropriately associated with certain outcomes.
One author even explains that there is "some concern in developing
countries over the selection of arbitrators" at entities such as ICSID, and
such appointments may create a "systemic ... bias in favor of Western legal
concepts and the positions."
Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 435, 450 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development and Outcomes] (quoting
AMAZU A. Asouzu, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AFRICAN STATES:
PRACTICE, PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 404-05 (2001)) (ellipses
in original) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 451 ("In a 2005 speech, Roberto
Dafiino, then Secretary-General of ICSID,... explained that there is a concern
'expressed by a few ... that ICSID arbitrators are predominantly nationals from
developed countries, the implication being that they may be more favorably inclined
towards investors' from the developed world and less favorably inclined towards
governments from the developing world." (second ellipsis in original)).
107. Leslie Mazoch, Chavez Takes Cool View Toward OAS, Says Latin America Better off
Without World Bank, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2007, 11:09 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpostcom/huff-wires/20070430/la-gen-venezuela-leftist-altemative.
108. As stated in the latest World Investment Report,
Developed-country investors brought most of the 70 known cases in 2015.
This follows the historical trend in which developed-country investors have
been the main ISDS users, accounting for over 80 per cent of all known
claims. The most frequent home States in ISDS in 2015 were the United
Kingdom, followed by Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands ....
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016: INVESTOR NATIONALITY. POLICY
CHALLENGES 105 (2016), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf.
109. See Kate Miles, Reconceptualising International Investment Law: Bringing the
Public Interest into Private Business, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND NATIONAL
AUTONOMY 295, 295-96 (Meredith Kolsky Lewis & Susy Frankel eds., 2010) ("Although
[ISDS] cases resolve questions that can affect significant matters of public policy, the
public generally does not have access to the documents, the proceedings are
conducted behind closed doors, and the submission of amicus curiae briefs is restricted,
if permitted at all."); Ho, supra note 22, at 234 (noting that "the proceedings and
decisions may lack the same level of transparency as mostjudicial decisions").
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Asia's ISDS proceeding against Australia was made available only
through a request for declassification"o under the Australian
Freedom of Information Act."' Compared with ISDS, dispute
settlement in the WTO is much more transparent-not only for
complainants and respondents but also for third parties, regardless of
whether they intervene or not. Virtually all of the key public
documents in the WTO process have been made available on the
international trading body's website.'
Finally, investors may file frivolous lawsuits, thereby wasting the
host state's scarce resources."' Even worse, those states that find it
costly to go through the ISDS process may be just too eager to change
their laws to avoid costly arbitrations."' It is therefore no surprise
that some commentators have criticized ISDS for providing "an
oversized public insurance scheme for companies that are unwilling
to assume the normal risks of doing business.""1 5
Even worse, given the high costs of ISDS arbitrations and the
potential for losing even more money through damage awards," 6
110. See Philip Morris Asia's Notice of Claim, supra note 14.
111. Freedom ofInformation Act 1982 (Cth) s 11A (Austl.).
112. See WTO Documents, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/docs
e/docs_e.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
113. See ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36.
114. See TPP's ISDS: Moving from State-to-State to Company-to-World Dispute Resolution,
LEGAL READER (May 1, 2015), http://www.legalreader.com/tpps-isds-moving-from-
state-to-state-to-company-to-world-dispute-resolution (surmising that New Zealand
"decided against changing their smoking laws out of fear of... retribution through
ISDS"); see also MouYAL, supra note 76, at 68 ("In response to [the foreign mining
industry's threat based on the U.K-Indonesia BIT or the Australia-Indonesia BIT],
Indonesia retreated from the ban [on open-cast mining in protected forest areas],
first by exempting several of the companies from the ban and promising to assess the
situation of other affected companies. Subsequently the government decided to
repeal the ban.").
115. Maude Barlow, CETA Changes Make Investor-State Provisions Worse, HUFFINGTON
PosT (Feb. 2, 2016, 3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/maude-barlow/ceta-
changes b_9130538.html; see also Daniel J. Ikenson, A Compromise to Advance the Trade
Agenda: Purge Negotiations of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, CATO INST. (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/compromise-advance-trade-
agenda-purge-negotiations-investor-state ("ISDS not only subsidizes MNCs
[multinational corporations], but particular kinds of MNCs. What may be too risky
an investment proposition without ISDS for Company A is not necessarily too risky
for Company B. By reducing the risk of investing abroad, then, ISDS is a subsidy for
more risk-averse companies.").
116. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (2007) ("Out of the eighty-two cases in the
present study, only forty-four quantified an investor's claimed damages either fully or
partially. The lowest amount claimed was in Maffezini v. Spain for approximately
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many developing countries may settle disputes even when their laws
have already met international standards, such as when they are in
full compliance with the TRIPS Agreement or other multilateral
agreements.11 7  Such coerced settlements regardless of compliance
with international standards, in turn, would cause the dispute
settlement process to lose legitimacy."' To avoid the challenges
posed by ISDS, countries such as Indonesia and South Africa have
already started terminating international investment agreements.'
US$155,314 (ESP 30 million) whereas the highest amount claimed was in Generation
Ukraine v. Ukraine for US$9.4 billion. Overall, the average amount of damages
claimed in those forty-four cases was approximately US$343.4 million." (footnotes
omitted)); id. at 58 ("There were fifty-two cases in which tribunals made awards that
resulted in a damages determination (if any) for treaty-based claims. Out of these
cases, there were thirty-one instances in which investors were awarded nothing. In
the remaining twenty-one instances, . . . [t]he average amount of damages awarded
by tribunals was approximately US$10.4 million." (footnotes omitted)); Susan D.
Franck, Using Investor-State Mediation Rules to Promote Conflict Management: An
Introductory Guide, 29 ICSID REV. 66, 79 (2014) [hereinafter Franck, Using Investor-
State Mediation Rules] ("[U] sing data from 159 final publicly-available awards [in a
more recent study], the average amount awarded (including settlements and
discontinuances where public records reflected a State transferred funds to the
claimants) was around US$16.6 million."); see also Ho, supra note 22, at 234
("Although there is a huge diversity in awards, even a lower award would still be
substantial for any developing country, such that a potential award ... could have a
substantial impact on domestic decisions.").
117. See Ho, supra note 22, at 222 ("Eli Lilly's suit may prompt other companies to
challenge not only patentability standards they disagree with, but also exceptions to
patent rights, even where these exceptions are permissible under TRIPS. This would
threaten recent and proposed patent laws that commentators have hailed as
promoting a better balance of patent rights and access to medicine.").
118. See Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 48
U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 693, 718 (2010) ("[B]y coercing law-abiding citizens to pay
settlements when they have not broken the law, the law will gradually lose its
legitimacy, and the damage to the copyright system and the rule of law ... could be
quite high."); Peter K. Yu, Tales of the Unintended in Copyright Law, 67 STUD. L. POL. &
Soc'y 1, 9 (2015) ("By forcing individual users to settle lawsuits regardless of the
legality of their actiorns, the statutory damages provision has greatly undermined the
attractiveness and legitimacy of not only copyright law but the entire legal system.").
119. See Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More than 60 Bilateral
Investment Treaties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3755clb2-b4e2-1 1e3-af92-00144feabdcO.html
("Indonesia is planning to terminate more than 60 bilateral investment treaties that
allow disgruntled foreign investors to bypass local courts and seek compensation in
international tribunals, amid a growing global backlash against such provisions.");
Adam Green, South Africa: BITs in Pieces, BEYONDBRICS (Oct. 19, 2012, 3:48 PM),
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/10/19/south-africa-bits-in-pieces ("South Africa
has terminated a bilateral investment treaty with Belgium and Luxembourg in the
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2. Interpretation-based weaknesses
The second type of weakness relates to interpretations by ISDS
arbitrators. As far as ISDS decisions are concerned, there are no
binding precedents. 120 Although stare decisis is a special feature of
common law, as opposed to civil law, disputing parties from all
around the world increasingly expect similar cases to be decided
consistently and predictably.12 ' For example, WTO panels and the
Appellate Body have used previous cases for explanation and support,
even though they are not required to follow any precedent.122 As the
first of a series of planned shreddings of post apartheid-era agreements which are
coming up for renewal.").
120. Compare Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, Precedents in International
Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 1505,
1508 ("Despite the absence of a formal doctrine of binding precedent, investment
tribunals generally rely on earlier awards to buttress their legal reasoning, often
treating them as determinative or authoritative statements of applicable rules or
principles of law." (footnote omitted)), and Loretta Malintoppi, Independence,
Impartiality, and Duty of Disclosure of Arbitrators, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 77,
at 789, 792 ("While it cannot be said that the rule of legal precedent (stare decisis)
applies in international arbitration in general, investment arbitration has witnessed a
growth in reported jurisprudence. Litigation parties frequently rely on this
jurisprudence to support their legal arguments and tribunals often apply these
precedents as grounds for their findings."), with Christoph Schreuer & Matthew
Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent?, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at 1188, 1196
("[I]n some cases tribunals did not follow earlier decisions but adopted different
solutions. At times, they simply adopted a different solution without distancing
themselves from the earlier decision. At other times, they referred to the earlier
decision and pointed out that they were unconvinced by what another tribunal had
said and that, therefore, their decision departed from the one adopted earlier.").
For discussions of the doctrine of precedent in relation to international investment
arbitration, see generally Bungenberg & Titi, supra; Joshua Karton, Lessons from
International Uniform Law, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 48;
Schreuer & Weiniger, supra; Andrds Rigo Sureda, Precedent in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw, supra note 76, at 830.
121. See Reinisch, supra note 76, at 905-08 (discussing the danger of inconsistent
investment arbitral awards).
122. As the WTO noted on its training materials,
Even if adopted, the reports of panels and the Appellate Body are not
binding precedents for other disputes between the same parties on other
matters or different parties on the same matter, even though the same
questions of WTO law might arise. As in other areas of international law,
there is no rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement according to which
previous rulings bind panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent cases.
This means that a panel is not obliged to follow previous Appellate Body
reports even if they have developed a certain interpretation of exactly the
provisions which are now at issue before the panel. Nor is the Appellate
Body obliged to maintain the legal interpretations it has developed in past
cases.... If the reasoning developed in the previous report in support of
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Appellate Body reasoned in Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,12 1 the
use of earlier relevant cases could help "create legitimate
expectations among WTO Members."124
Within the intellectual property field, there is also a considerable
concern that ISDS arbitrators would subscribe to a narrow view of
intellectual property rights. In doing so, they may focus primarily on
the protection levels without adequately considering the
corresponding limitations or exceptions. They may also ignore the
many limitations, flexibilities, and safeguards that have been carefully
built into the TRIPS Agreement.12' From the standpoint of a host
state, especially one in the developing world, overlooking these
limitations, flexibilities, and safeguards is particularly problematic,
considering that ISDS is often included in TRIPS-plus trade or
investment agreements-agreements that are established outside the
multilateral process to ratchet up the TRIPS standards. 2
Finally, ISDS arbitrators may have tunnel vision. With respect to
intellectual property investments, they may focus narrowly on only
the intellectual property side of the investment bargain. As a result,
they may ignore the existence of concessions outside the intellectual
the interpretation given to a WTO rule is persuasive from the perspective of
the panel or the Appellate Body in the subsequent case, it is very likely that
the panel or the-Appellate Body will repeat and follow it. This is also in line
with a key objective of the dispute settlement system which is to enhance the
security and predictability of the multilateral trading system ....
Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate Body Reports and DSB Recommendations and Rulings,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/dispsettlemen
t cbt e/c7s2pl_e.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
123. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Docs.
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
124. Id. at 14.
125. See Yu, International Enclosure Movement, supra note 56, at 863, 869-70
(discussing the limitations, flexibilities and public interest safeguards in the TRIPS
Agreement). For commentaries emphasizing the flexibilities within the TRIPS
Agreement, see generally CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007);
UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, RESOURCE BOOK
ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2005).
126. See Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting Controversy? Reactions to
the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade
Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 259 (criticizing the U.S.-Australia Free Trade
Agreement); Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 50, at 392-400 (discussing the
growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to push for higher intellectual
property standards). See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
(Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays
discussing free trade agreements in the intellectual property context).
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property field, such as free lands, tax breaks, exemption from export
custom duties, and preferential treatment on foreign exchange. 27
Overlooking these offsetting concessions is particularly problematic
because the concessions would not have been offered in the first
place had intellectual property protection and enforcement been as
strong as investors had anticipated.
3. Outcome-based weaknesses
The third type of weakness concerns the final outcomes of ISDS
arbitrations. There are at least five widely documented weaknesses
regarding arbitral awards. First, the total compensation can be very
high. A case in point is the $50 billion ISDS award that was given as
compensation for Russia's wrongful expropriation of the now-defunct
Yukos Oil, the country's once biggest oil producer."' To put this
award in the right comparative context, it is important to recall that
the gross domestic product (GDP) of many developing countries,
including those in the European Union, does not reach that
amount.' Even Peru and Vietnam, two of the twelve TPP partners,
127. As Peter Muchlinski observed,
Incentives are used by governments to attract investment, to steer investment
into favoured industries or regions, or to influence the character of an
investment, for example, when technology-intensive investment is being
sought. They can take two major forms, fiscal incentives, based on tax
advantages to investors, and financial incentives based on the provision of
funds directly to investors to finance new investments, or certain operations,
or to defray capital or operational costs. Other types of incentives may not
be easy to discern but they can have a positive effect on the overall
profitability of an investment. These may include general infrastructure
development by the host country, market preferences or preferential
treatment on foreign exchange.
Muchlinski, supra note 77, at 33 (footnote omitted); see also Anastasia Telesetsky, A
New Investment Deal in Asia and Africa: Land Leases to Foreign Investors, in EVOLUTION IN
INVESTMENT TREATY IAW AND ARBITRATION 539 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds.,
2011) [hereinafter EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY] (discussing the various
concessions that states in Asia and Africa have made to attract FDI).
128. See Henry Meyer, Russia Faces $50 Billion Fight in US., UK. for Yukos Damages,
BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2015, 9:40 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 20
15-07-24/russia-faces-50-billion-fight-in-u-s-u-k-for-yukos-damages (reporting the $50
billion arbitration award). The award is currently under appeal in the Netherlands,
and Russia has no plan to pay the damages. Id.; Anthony Deutsch, Russia Appeals
Order to Pay $50 Bln to Yukos Shareholders in Netherlands, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2016, 5:42
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/russia-yukos-appeal-netherlands-idUSL8N1501P 2 .
129. In 2015, those EU members that had a GDP lower than the Yukos Oil award
included Bulgaria ($48.95 billion), Croatia ($48.73 billion), Cyprus ($19.32 billion),
Estonia ($22.69 billion), Latvia ($27.04 billion), Lithuania ($41.24 billion), and
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had a GDP of only less than four times the Yukos Oil award.
According to World Bank data, the GDP of these countries was
slightly above $190 billion in 2015."0
Second, ISDS allows transnational corporations to challenge
legitimate regulations, such as those concerning public health, labor,
and the environment. 31  Such challenges would create what
commentators, intergovernmental bodies, and civil society
organizations have widely referred to as "regulatory chill"' 2-a chilling
effect that undermines a country's sovereign ability to regulate harmful
conducts, including those committed by transnational corporations. 3
Recent examples of such chill include Philip Morris's attempts to use
ISDS to challenge the plain-packaging regulations for tobacco
products in Australia and Uruguay and Eli Lilly's ongoing effort to
challenge the patentability requirements in Canada. 134
Regulatory chill, while difficult to prove,'"' is particularly
problematic in the intellectual property field,' 6 an area in which
Slovenia ($42.75 billion). GDP (Current US$), WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
130. See id. (listing the 2015 GDP of Peru and Vietnam at $192.08 billion and
$193.6 billion, respectively).
131. See MOUYAL, supra note 76, at 68 (discussing the adverse implications of the
foreign mining industry's threat of using the U.K.-Indonesia BIT or the Australia-
Indonesia BIT to challenge an Indonesian forestry act that bans open-cast mining in
protected forest areas); Jane Kelsey & Lori Wallach, "Investor-State" Disputes in Trade
Pacts Threaten Fundamental Principles of National Judicial Systems, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Apr.
2012), https://www.citizen.org/documents/isds-domestic-legal-process-background-
brief.pdf ("Over $350 million in compensation has already been paid out to
corporations in a series of Investor-State cases under NAFTA alone. This included
attacks on natural resource policies, environmental protection and health and safety
measures, and more."); see also supra text accompanying notes 13-24 (recounting
Philip Morris's attempts to use ISDS to challenge the plain-packaging regulations for
tobacco products in Australia and Uruguay and Eli Lilly's ongoing effort to challenge
the patentability requirements in Canada).
132. See, e.g., MOUYAL, supra note 76, at 67-68 (providing examples of "regulatory
chill"); UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015: REFORMING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE 128 (2015) (considering "regulatory chill" to be a concern
of ISDS); Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from
Political Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 127, at 606 (using
political science to analyze the "regulatory chill" hypothesis).
133. See Ho, supra note 22, at 233 ("A major issue is that the suits appear to
improperly encroach on domestic authority and even have a chilling effect on
legitimate state regulatory functions due to substantial awards, as well as legal costs of
defending such cases.").
134. See supra text accompanying notes 13-24.
135. As Jonathan Bonnitcha explained,
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autonomy and policy space are badly needed for countries to tailor
their intellectual property systems to local needs, interests,
conditions, and priorities.' As Ruth Okediji lamented,
Intellectual property obligations in the investment context ... pose
a new threat to states' traditional lawmaking powers by providing
foreign actors [with] a singular opportunity to challenge laws that
have been enacted with the domestic public interest in full view,
even when they are in conformity with international intellectual
property treaties. Subverting a core judicial function-
interpretation of a domestic law already infused with multilateral
obligations-to the oversight of a private international tribunal
precariously alters the contours of state power and responsibility
for compliant domestic legislation and policy prescriptions.1 3 8
Third, ISDS will provide new fora for private investors and their
supportive states to sue developing country governments.'13  The
typical fora in which complaints can be filed against these
governments are domestic courts and international adjudicatory
bodies, such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.140 By providing
Chilling effects are difficult to identify because they require counterfactual
evidence about the regulations that would have existed in the absence of the
purported chilling. Regulatory chill due to [international investment treaty]
protection is particularly difficult to isolate because, in addition to
identifying a chilling effect, one must be able to exclude the possibility that it
was attributable to some other cause.
Jonathan Bonnitcha, Outline of a Normative Framework for Evaluating Interpretations of
Investment Treaty Protections, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 127, at
117, 134 (footnote omitted).
136. See Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"?, supra note 25, at 1133 ("The
conception of intellectual property as a tool to advance national welfare has long
been part of multilateral intellectual property relations. The basis for determining
the 'legitimate expectations' of an intellectual property 'investment' thus must
resonate in domestic law.").
137. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Under BITs,
FTAs and TRIPS: Conflicting Regimes or Mutual Coherence?, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT
TREATY, supra note 127, at 485 (discussing the impact of the TRIPS Agreement and
TRIPS-plus bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements on the state's
enjoyment of its policy space); see also Yu, International Enclosure Movement, supra note
56, at 833-55 (discussing why policymakers need wide policy space to devise solutions
to address internal problems).
138. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"?, supra note 25, at 1122.
139. See ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36 ("For some critics there is a discomfort that
ISDS provides an additional channel for investors to sue governments, including a
belief that all disputes (even international law disputes) should be resolved in
domestic courts.").
140. See Pauwelyn, supra note 103, at 767 ("[P]rivate actors are, in many cases,
pulling the strings and paying private law firms to do the litigation, before whatever
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alternative fora, ISDS will allow private actors to bypass these widely
used processes. Even worse, the investors' home governments can
still file complaints through traditional state-to-state dispute
settlement processes. As a result, ISDS is likely to spark a vicious cycle
that will generate more disputes. After all, diplomatic and other non-
trade reasons may induce governments to exercise restraint in filing
state-to-state complaints.
Fourth, and more specifically in the intellectual property context,
ISDS may encourage arbitrators to focus on rights that do not fall
squarely within the TRIPS Agreement or other multilateral
intellectual property agreements, such as those administered by the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Although most
international investment agreements define "investment" broadly to
cover all forms of "intellectual property rights,""' perhaps even
including licenses to or applications of those rights,142 the TRIPS
Agreement explicitly covers only eight categories of rights-namely,
copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets, geographical
indications, industrial designs, layout designs of integrated circuits,
and plant variety protections."' To be sure, one can make a strong
argument that the TRIPS Agreement also covers "utility models, trade
names, and other forms of unfair competition,""' due to its
forum or forums are best for the client: in some cases, it may be the WTO; in others,
investor-state arbitration; in yet others, parallel proceedings.").
141. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.1 (including "intellectual property
rights" under subsection (f) of the definition of "investment").
142. See id. art. 9.1 n.4 ("Whether a particular type of licence, authorisation,
permit or similar instrument (including a concession to the extent that it has the
nature of such an instrument) has the characteristics of an investment depends on
such factors as the nature and extent of the rights that the holder has under the
Party's law."); see also Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant, supra note 31, at 878-79
(discussing whether an application for intellectual property rights would qualify as a
covered investment). As Carlos Correa explained,
Patent applications ... may be traded and, in some countries, patent
applications generate rights even before they are granted, such as the ability
to act against infringers. Though it is clear that a still-unregistered invention
is not an IPR, it may be argued that the application is, in any case, an
"intangible property" as long as it is "owned" and can be assigned to third
parties. Further, some investment agreements refer in the definition of
"investment" to "rights with respect to copyrights, patents . . . ." This wording
may be intended to encompass not only granted rights but also applications.
Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 52, at 340 (footnotes omitted).
143. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 9-40.
144. Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239, 256
n.82 (2012).
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incorporation of the Paris Convention."' Nonetheless, it remains
debatable whether the Agreement covers sui generis database
protection, broadcast rights, and exclusivity regimes used to protect
clinical trial data. These additional protections are generally referred
to as "TRIPS-extra" obligations-obligations that lie outside the scope
of the TRIPS Agreement and that may not be subject to the
mandatory WTO dispute settlement process."'
Finally, ISDS may allow private investors to rewrite the TRIPS
Agreement-or, for that matter, other multilateral trade or
intellectual property agreements.1 4 1 Such rewriting will undermine
the hard-earned bargains developing countries have won through the
WTO negotiations.14' A case in point is the moratorium imposed on
non-violation complaints-complaints of nullification or impairment
of trade benefits when no substantive violation has occurred. 149 Since
the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, this moratorium has been
145. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.1 ("Members shall comply with
Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967).").
146. See Yu, International Enclosure Movement, supra note 56, at 868-69 (discussing
"TRIPS-extra" obligations).
147. See Ho, supra note 22, at 223 (arguing that "permitting companies to
challenge domestic decisions regarding intellectual property through investor-state
disputes is problematic because they disrupt internationally agreed norms under
TRIPS, and also because the historical justifications for protecting foreign investors
do not apply"); Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"?, supra note 25, at 1123-24
("On face value, Eli Lilly's claims could effectively constitute a revision of NAFTA. If
Lilly is successful in its grander objective-a ruling that Canada is required to change
its current utility standard-the implications for intellectual property multilateralism,
and for intellectual property policy in all countries, would be stunning indeed.").
148. See Susy Frankel, Interpreting the Overlap of International Investment and
Intellectual Property Law, 19J. INT'L EcoN. L. 121, 124 (2016) ("The current investment
disputes where investors claim indirect expropriation or the absence of fair and
equitable treatment of IP are not just IP in a new forum, but point toward a shift
away from the balancing mechanisms that are integral to IP (even if those
mechanisms do not always operate as well as they might) to a sphere which has fewer
(if any) equivalent balancing mechanisms." (footnotes omitted)); Ho, supra note 22,
at 250 ("Beyond interfering with an existing dispute resolution process and
producing potentially inconsistent decisions, permitting investor-state arbitrations to
overrule internationally agreed upon domestic flexibilities under TRIPS seems
particularly unfair to countries since TRIPS already encroaches on traditional
domestic authority in the area of intellectual property rights."); see also Ruth L.
Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property
Protection, 1 U. OTrAWA L. & TECH. J. 125, 129 (2004) (lamenting that bilateral free
trade agreements threaten to "roll back both substantive and strategic gains" won by
developing countries in multilateral process).
149. See generally Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential
Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12J. INT'L EcoN. L. 1023, 1059 (2009) (discussing non-
violation complaints in the TRIPS context).
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repeatedly extended-most recently during the Tenth WTO
Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in December 2015.1"0 Despite this
extension, nothing can prevent ISDS arbitrators from considering
complaints that are based on impaired benefits or frustrated
expectations, as opposed to substantive violations.
Similarly, Brook Baker and Katrina Geddes expressed concern that
"there is a risk that an IP rightholder might bring a claim because of a
governmental failure to intercept alleged infringing products in-transit
via stringent border measures.""' In their view, such a failure "might
be interpreted to violate the right to fair and equitable treatment in
administrative border procedures."' 5 2  Considering the controversy
generated by in-transit seizures of pharmaceutical products during the
negotiation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 5 3 their
concern is well justified. At that time, the repeated seizures of in-
transit generic drugs were so contentious that India and Brazil filed
complaints against the European Union and the Netherlands before
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.'5 ' Although India and the
150. See World Trade Organization, TRIPS Non-Violation and Situation Complaints:
Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(15)/41 (noting the
agreement not to initiate any non-violation complaints under the TRIPS Agreement
until the next WTO Ministerial Meeting in December 2017).
151. Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-State
Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines-Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement, 23J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 34 (2015) (footnote omitted).
152. Id.
153. See Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975,
1009 (2011) ("[1In the middle of the negotiations, the discussion of the seizure of in-
transit generic drugs became a very hot issue due to new developments in Germany,
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom."); Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy,
and Viral Sovereignty, 45 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1563, 1588 (2013) ("During the ACTA
negotiations, stories about the seizure of pharmaceuticals in Europe have raised
important questions about the intellectual property enforcement standards set in the
TRIPS Agreement and the handling of in-transit goods under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade."). For discussions of the seizure of in-transit drugs,
see generally CYNTHIA M. Ho, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL EcONOMY:
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 285-323 (2011);
Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on Allegations of
Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public Welfare, 1
WIPOJ. 43, 44 (2009); Bryan Mercurio, "Seizing" Pharmaceuticals in Transit: Analysing
the WTO Dispute That Wasn't, 61 INT'L &COMP. L.Q. 389 (2012).
154. See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member State-
Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010); Request
for Consultations by Brazil, European Union and a Member State-Seizure of Generic Drugs
in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010).
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European Union eventually reached an interim settlement in July
2011,15 neither Brazil nor India has withdrawn its complaint.
4. Summary
Although ISDS has some benefits, it also has many major
drawbacks, including those relating to the arbitration process, the
arbitrators' interpretations, and final arbitral outcomes. Even more
problematic, the proceedings Philip Morris and Eli Lilly initiated
have revealed the major flaws of ISDS, as none of those proceedings
actually intends to take advantage of the mechanism's purported
benefits. Australia and Canada are not generally considered to be
countries lacking in respect for the rule of law or a well-functioning
judicial system. Nor have the governments in these countries been
widely criticized for their complicity in acts of piracy and
counterfeiting. Instead, these proceedings were merely initiated to
challenge the host states' legitimate regulations, such as tobacco
control measures or patentability requirements.
From a legal standpoint, challenging intellectual property
standards is not only controversial but also highly problematic
because any change in these standards could affect disparate players
in different ways. As Peter Jaszi noted, "one nation's 'piracy[]' is
another man's 'technology transfer.""" Given the multifaceted
impacts that a change in intellectual property standards will have, Eli
Lilly's NAFTA complaint has put Canada in a catch-22 situation. If
the promise doctrine is held to be inconsistent with the country's
investment-related obligations, Canada will have to abandon the
doctrine lest it be required to compensate multinational
pharmaceutical companies for their lost expectations. Nevertheless,
if Canada did abandon the doctrine in an effort to settle the
investment dispute with Eli Lilly, it would have to stand ready to face
ISDS complaints from generic drug manufacturers. As Professor
Okediji insightfully observed,
[F]oreign generic pharmaceutical companies that have invested in
the Canadian market arguably have benefitted from the very utility
doctrine Lilly is contesting. If Canada changes its law to address
Lilly's demands, could those firms successfully claim that the new
155. See India, EU Ink Deal to End Drug Seizure for Now, TIMES INDIA (July 29, 2011,
1:21 AM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/India-EU-
ink-deal-to-end-drug-seizure-for-now/articleshow/9401916.cms.
156. Peter Jaszi, A Garland of Reflections on Three International Copyright Topics, 8
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 63 (1989).
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standard amounts to an indirect appropriation since it would alter
the competitive equilibrium between them and Lilly?157
It is therefore understandable why Professor Okediji called for the
development of an ISDS provision that is narrowly tailored to "a
particular action, rather than the interpretation of an intellectual
property standard."15 s
III. TPP INVESTMENT CHAPTER
On February 4, 2016, the United States and its eleven trading
partners in the Asia-Pacific region signed the TPP Agreement in
Auckland, New Zealand."' This Agreement contains thirty chapters,
including one each on investment (Chapter 9), intellectual property
(Chapter 18), and dispute settlement (Chapter 28).60 Because
policymakers, commentators, and civil society organizations have
already widely criticized the intellectual property chapters in TRIPS-
plus trade agreements,"1 this Part does not rehash these criticisms.
Instead, this Part devotes its analysis to the other two chapters, which
help develop the TPP ISDS mechanism. In the view of its critics, this
mechanism will not only allow private intellectual property investors
to sue national governments without the support of their home
governments, but it will also amplify the widely documented
deleterious impacts of the TPP intellectual property chapter.' 2
157. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"?, supra note 25, at 1127.
158. As Professor Okediji observed,
A narrowly tailored ISDS provision could be useful for situations where a
host country specifically targets the intellectual property right of a particular
investor. An example may be the issuance of a compulsory license without
complying with the domestic process established to provide legal certainty
for an investor pursuant to TRIPS. Because this type of dispute targets a
particular action, rather than the interpretation of an intellectual property
standard, the policy-making ability of the host state is not threatened, and
the dispute would not undo the TRIPS balance or compel potentially
inconsistent normative outcomes across countries.
Id. at 1137.
159. Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministers' Statement, supra note 7.
160. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, chs. 9, 18, 28.
161. See sources cited supra note 126.
162. As Carlos Correa explained,
Intellectual property rights, registered or not, are protected investments
under BITs and trade agreements that incorporate rules on investment.
This adds another layer of treaty-based protection onto rights protected
under the TRIPS Agreement and other international conventions. But this
protection goes beyond TRIPS, because investment agreements apply to
rights not covered by the TRIPS Agreement and incorporate the national
8652017]
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To provide a better understanding of the investment-related
aspects of the TPP Agreement, this Part closely examines the ISDS
mechanism outlined in the Agreement's investment chapter.
Although this chapter goes beyond ISDS to cover other investment-
related issues-such as freedom from discrimination, protection
against uncompensated expropriation of property, protection against
denial of justice, and the right to transfer capital 16 -this Part will
focus on the various safeguards that the TPP Agreement has put in
place to improve this mechanism. This Part ends by briefly
identifying the weaknesses that the Agreement has yet to address.
A. Sovereignty and Regulatory Space
The TPP Agreement has instituted at least four sets of
improvements to address the current weaknesses of ISDS. The first
set of improvements targets the concerns about sovereignty and
regulatory space. These improvements help reserve to each TPP
partner the ability to regulate in the public interest.6 Article 9.16 of
the TPP Agreement explicitly declares,
treatment principle clause without the exceptions provided for under IPR
treaties.
Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 52, at 352.
163. As the United States Trade Representative (USTR) declared in its fact sheet
on ISDS,
In U.S. agreements, the investment rules enforced by ISDS provide investors
in foreign countries [with] basic protections from foreign government
actions such as:
Freedom from discrimination: An assurance that Americans doing business
abroad will face a level playing field and will not be treated less favorably
than local investors or competitors from third countries.
Protection against uncompensated expropriation of property: An assurance that
the property of investors will not be seized by the government without the
payment ofjust compensation.
Protection against denial of justice An assurance that investors will not be
denied justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings.
Right to transfer capital An assurance that investors will be able to move
capital relating to their investments freely, subject to safeguards to provide
governments flexibility, including to respond to financial crises and to
ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.
ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36.
164. See OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TPP CHAPTER SUMMARY-INVESTMENT 6
(2016) [hereinafter INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Investment.pdf ("TPP includes new language
underscoring that countries retain the right to regulate in the public interest,
including to protect public health, safety, financial stability, and the environment.
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Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise
consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure
that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives. 6 5
To ensure financial stability, Article 9.3.3 further states that the
investment chapter does not cover financial services."'
During the TPP negotiations, Philip Morris's ISDS proceedings
have sparked serious concerns among some TPP partners, most
notably Australia and Malaysia.1 6' To alleviate these concerns, Article
29.5 explicitly recognizes the health authorities' ability to introduce
tobacco control measures:
A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of Chapter 9
(Investment) with respect to claims challenging a tobacco control
measure of the Party. Such a claim shall not be submitted to
arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) if a Party
has made such an election. If a Party has not elected to deny
benefits with respect to such claims by the time of the submission
of such a claim to arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9
(Investment), a Party may elect to deny benefits during the
proceedings. For greater certainty, if a Party elects to deny benefits
with respect to such claims, any such claim shall be dismissed. 168
Although this provision is important to intellectual property and
investment policies, the provision interestingly cannot be found in
either the intellectual property or investment chapter. Instead, it is
available in the exceptions chapter-the second last chapter of the
TPP Agreement.
TPP will also include a separate, explicit recognition of health authorities' right to
adopt tobacco control measures in order to protect public health.").
165. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.16.
166. Id. art. 9.3.3.
167. See Julien Chaisse, TPP Agreement: Towards Innovations in Investment Rule-
Making, in THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENIY-FIRST CENTURY
TRADE AGREEMENT 147, 153 (C.L. Lim et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter TRANs-PAcIFIc
PARTNERSHIP] ("Australia is trying to persuade all TPP members to do away with ISDS
in the investment chapter."); Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare?-Intellectual
Property Rights, Health and the Evolution of Treaty Drafting in International Investment
Agreements, 6 J. INT'L Disp. SETTLEMENT 252, 273-75 (2015) [hereinafter Mercurio,
Safeguarding Public Welfare? (discussing Malaysia's proposal for "a complete carve-
out from all TPP obligations for any tobacco control measure").
168. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 29.5.
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B. ISDS Process
The second set of improvements addresses the procedural flaws of
ISDS. Specifically, the TPP Agreement empowers arbitral tribunals to
review and dismiss frivolous claims as well as to award costs and
attorneys' fees. '6  Article 9.23.4 states that "a tribunal shall address
and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the respondent
that. . . a claim is manifestly without legal merit.""o Article 9.29.4
states further, "[i]f the tribunal determines [the] claims to be
frivolous, the tribunal may award to the respondent reasonable costs
and attorney's fees.""' Although this fee-shifting arrangement is
important to investors, it would limit the host state's ability to control
arbitration costs.' 72 By adding these costs on top of compensation,
this arrangement would also greatly increase the burden of any host
state losing in the arbitration.
In addition, the TPP Agreement imposes on investors "the burden
of proving all elements of [their] claims, consistent with general
principles of international law applicable to international
arbitration.""' The Agreement also limits claims to those that have
occurred within three-and-a-half years7 4 and that involve more than
169. See INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 4 ("Ensuring, as under
the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that panels are able, on an expedited basis,
to review and dismiss frivolous claims and award costs and attorneys' fees to the
respondent government.').
170. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.23.4; see alSo INVESTMENT CHAPTER
SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 6 ("TPP expands existing rules discouraging frivolous
suits by permitting governments to seek expedited review and dismissal of claims that
are 'manifestly without legal merit."').
171. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.29.4.
172. See JOUBIN-BRET, supra note 72, at 4 ("Another recent development in
investment arbitration, alongside the skyrocketing of costs, is the trend to shift costs
to the losing party and to depart from the traditional rule in international arbitration
that each party bears its costs. While this development could be seen as a positive
way of restoring balance and barring frivolous claims, it also brings new risk for states
in the defence and control over costs of investment arbitration and, of course, an
increased responsibility for state actors in charge of investment arbitration cases.").
173. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.23.7; see also INVESTMENT CHAPTER
SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 6 ("A new provision in TPP clarifies that the claimant-
the investor bringing the case against the government-bears the burden to prove
all elements of its claims, including claims of breach of the minimum standard of
treatment ... obligation, an obligation which guarantees investors due process and
certain other protections in accordance with customary international law.").
174. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.21.1 ("No claim shall be submitted to
arbitration ... if more than three years and six months have elapsed from the date
on which the claimant first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the
breach alleged. . . ."); see also ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36 ("A three-year statute of
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mere expectations of profits.17 ' For the minimum standards of
treatment, Article 9.6.4 explicitly states that "the mere fact that a
Party takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with an
investor's expectations does not constitute a breach . .. even if there
is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result."176
To prevent forum shopping, the TPP Agreement requires
claimants in ISDS proceedings to "waive the right to initiate parallel
proceedings in other fora challenging the same measures."
Although Article 28.4.1 allows the claimant to "select the forum in
which to settle the dispute," 17 ' Article 28.4.2 states, "Once a
complaining Party has requested the establishment of, or referred a
matter to, a panel or other tribunal under an agreement referred to
in paragraph 1, the forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of
other fora."17 ' Thus, by "prevent[ing] a party from pursuing the same
claims both in ISDS proceedings and domestic courts,"18 this waiver
will greatly reduce the host state's burden of defending investor-state
disputes simultaneously in multiple fora.
To further minimize burden, Article 9.28 permits the consolidation
of ISDS claims that "have a question of law or fact in common and
[that] arise out of the same events or circumstances."181  Such
consolidation will benefit the disputing parties on both sides as it will
"increase efficiency, reduce litigation costs, and prevent strategic
initiation of duplicative litigation."18
Finally, the TPP Agreement limits the ISDS mechanism to a
specific group of complainants. Specifically, it "allows a TPP Party to
deny benefits to 'shell companies' owned by persons of that Party or a
non-Party that establishes in another TPP country in order to take
advantage of treaty rights but that lack substantial business activities
limitations protects respondents against old claims, which are difficult for
governments to defend in part because access to documents and witnesses becomes
more difficult over time.").
175. See INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 6 ("TPP explicitly
clarifies that an investor cannot win a claim for breach of the [minimum standards of
treatment] obligation merely by showing that a government measure frustrated its
expectations (for example, its expectations of earning certain profits).").
176. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.6.4.
177. INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 5.
178. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28.4.1.
179. Id. art. 28.4.2.
180. ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36.
181. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.28.1.
182. ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36.
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in that country. "" Article 9.1 specifically defines the term
"enterprise of a Party" as "an enterprise constituted or organised
under the law of a Party, or a branch located in the territory of a
Party and carrying out business activities there."8 4
C. Transparency
The third set of improvements concerns transparency. Under the
TPP Agreement, arbitral proceedings will remain open and publicly
accessible."' Article 9.24.1 specifically requires the respondent to
make publicly available the following documents:
(a) the notice of intent;
(b) the notice of arbitration;
(c) pleadings, memorials and briefs submitted to the tribunal by a
disputing party and any written submissions submitted pursuant to
Article 9.23.2 (Conduct of the Arbitration) and Article 9.23.3 and
Article 9.28 (Consolidation);
(d) minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, if available;
and
(e) orders, awards and decisions of the tribunal.1 8 6
According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative
(USTR), the State Department's website will contain all submissions,
hearing transcripts, and other key documents regarding TPP-based
183. INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 3; see also Carlos Correa &
Jorge E. Vifiuales, Intellectual Property Rights as Protected Investments: How Open Are the
Gates?, 19 J. INT'L EcON. L. 91, 108 (2016) ("The entreprise-based approach would
not allow the right-holder of IPRs to claim investors' rights in a country where it has
not established or acquired an enterprise, thereby limiting the possibility of using
[international investment agreements] as a basis to challenge national decisions on
the validity or enforceability of IPRs."); Christina Knahr, Investments "in the Territory"
of the Host State, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw, supra note 76, at 42, 42
(discussing what constitutes investments "in the territory" of the host state); Christina
Knahr, The Territorial Nexus Between an Investment and the Host State, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 590, 590 (discussing the nexus between
the investment and the host state). For similar discussions, but with a focus on the
investors, see generally Mark Feldman, Distinguishing Investors from Exporters Under
Investment Treaties, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 760; Lucy F. Reed
& Jonathan E. Davis, Who Is a Protected Investor?, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 614 (discussing who is a protected investor within the
meaning of an international investment agreement).
184. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.1.
185. Id. art. 9.24.1-2.
186. Id. art. 9.24.1.
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investment cases against the United States. 17 Such transparency will
ensure high-quality decision making while promoting democratic
values, public participation, accountability, and legitimacy.18
In addition, TPP partners will establish a code of conduct for ISDS
arbitrators to ensure independence and impartiality.8  Article
28.10.1(d) of the TPP Agreement explicitly requires all members of
the dispute settlement panels, including ISDS arbitrators, to "comply
with the code of conduct in the Rules of Procedure."'" Before any
final rulings, disputing parties will also have an opportunity to review
and comment on proposed arbitral awards."' Article 28.17.7
specifically grants to these parties the opportunity to "submit written
comments to the panel on its initial report,""' somewhat similarly to
the interim review provided in the WTO dispute settlement
process."l Through a decision of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Commission,' TPP partners can further agree on joint
interpretations that will bind arbitral tribunals.'
187. See INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 4 ("For investor-State
cases against the United States under TPP, all submissions, hearing transcripts, and
other key documents will be available on the U.S. State Department website.").
188. See Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in
OxFoRD HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at 721, 761-62.
189. INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 6. For discussions on issues
relating to the independence and impartiality of international arbitrators, see
generally Malintoppi, supra note 120; Audley Sheppard, Arbitrator Independence in
ICSID Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw, supra note 76, at 131.
190. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28.10.1(d).
191. See INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 4 ("Ensuring that
disputing parties will be able to review and comment on proposed arbitral awards
prior to their issuance, and to allow both disputing parties the option to challenge a
tribunal award.").
192. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28.17.7.
193. See DSU, supra note 70, art. 15 (providing for an interim review stage).
194. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 27.1-.2.2 (calling for the Commission's
establishment and outlining its functions); see also Sergio Puig, The Role of Procedure in
the Development of Investment Law: The Case of Section B of Chapter 11 of NAFTA, in
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREKIy, supra note 127, at 339, 362-65 (discussing the
binding interpretation of the Free Trade Commission within NAFTA).
195. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.25.3 ("A decision of the Commission
on the interpretation of a provision of this Agreement ... shall be binding on a
tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that
decision."); see also INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 5 ("Ensuring
that TPP Parties, at any time, can agree on interpretations of the agreement that are
binding on tribunals.").
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D. Tunnel Vision
The final set of improvements responds to concerns about the
ISDS arbitrators' tunnel vision and their over-emphasis of intellectual
property rights as investors' rights. As Rochelle Dreyfuss and Susy
Frankel described,
Because investor rights and IP rights are both private rights, IP
holders tend to equate the investment protectable under these
instruments to the private economic value of their IP rights.
Further, they see IP rights as reliance interests that are defined by
the law at the time they made their investment or, more extremely,
when the agreement references TRIPS or its own IP chapter, the
law at the time when the investment agreement was made. '9 6
To avoid narrow interpretation and over-emphasis on the
investment's economic value, the TPP Agreement allows civil society
organizations, environmental groups, labor unions, and other interested
stakeholders to file amicus curiae briefs"'-arrangements that can also
be found in NAFTA"' and the WTO.1" Article 9.23.3 provides,
After consultation with the disputing parties, the tribunal may
accept and consider written amicus curiae submissions regarding a
matter of fact or law within the scope of the dispute that may assist
196. Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 26, at 589.
197. See INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 4 ("Ensuring that
interested stakeholders, including labor unions, civil society organizations and other
interested stakeholders, can submit amicus curiae or 'friend of the court' briefs."); see also
Andrea K Bjorklund, The Participation of Sub-National Government Units as Amici Curiae in
International Investment Disputes, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 127, at
298 (discussing the historically limited participation of sub-state actors in the filing of
amicus curiae briefs); Delaney & Magraw, supra note 188, at 777-80 (discussing the
advantages of public participation through the filing of amicus curiae briefs).
198. See Daniel Kalderimis, Exploring the Differences Between WTO and Investment
Treaty Dispute Resolution, in TRADE AGREEMENTS AT THE CROSSROADS 46, 54-55 (Susy
Frankel & Meredith Kolsky Lewis eds., 2014) (discussing the filing of amicus curiae
briefs in NAFTA disputes); Puig, supra note 194, at 360-62 (discussing the filing of
amicus curiae briefs in Chapter 11 cases).
199. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 173, 183-91 (2000) (examining the role that nongovernmental
organizations do and should play in the WTO dispute settlement process, including the
submission of amici curiae briefs); Jacqueline Peel, Giving the Public a Voice in the
Protection of the Global Environment: Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution
at the European Court ofJustice and World Trade Organization, 12 COLO.J. INT'L ENvrL. L. &
POL'Y 47, 61-70 (2001) (discussing the opportunity that the WTO dispute settlement
process provides to nongovernmental organizations for participating in environmental
cases); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus Brief Battle at the WTO,
7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 87, 95-101 (2001) (exploring the arguments supporting and
criticizing the increased judicialization of WTO dispute resolution, with a particular
emphasis on the battle over amicus curiae briefs).
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the tribunal in evaluating the submissions and arguments of the
disputing parties from a person or entity that is not a disputing
party but has a significant interest in the arbitral proceedings.200
Likewise, Article 28.13(e) states that "the [dispute settlement] panel
shall consider requests from non-governmental entities located in the
territory of a disputing Party to provide written views regarding the
dispute that may assist the panel in evaluating the submissions and
arguments of the disputing Parties. "201
As Professors Dreyfuss and Frankel reminded us, "More transparency,
receptivity to amicus briefing, consultation with other international
organizations (along the lines of the relationship between the WTO and
WIPO), and references to the decisions of other tribunals would provide
decision makers with a broader context in which to consider disputed
issues. "202 The filing of amicus curiae briefs can be highly beneficial as
these briefs "can improve the quality of decisions by providing factual
information of various types to the tribunal of which it would not
otherwise be aware." 20 s Such filing "can also provide [the relevant
tribunal] with specialized expertise relating to public interest concerns
in a case ... [as well as] legal argumentation that the parties, for various
reasons, do not provide to the tribunal."0
In addition, the TPP Agreement allows non-disputing parties, such
as the investors' home states, to make submissions to arbitral
tribunals.20" Article 28.14, which covers third-party participation,
specifically declares,
A Party that is not a disputing Party and that considers it has an
interest in the matter before the panel shall, on delivery of a
written notice to the disputing Parties, be entitled to attend all
hearings, make written submissions, present views orally to the
panel, and receive written submissions of the disputing Parties.0
E. Summary
Taken together, the improvements in the TPP Agreement have
provided the ISDS mechanism with some important upgrades.
Nevertheless, the added substantive and procedural safeguards fail to
alleviate many of the weaknesses documented in Section II.B. For
200. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.23.3.
201. Id. art. 28.13(e).
202. Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 26, at 599.
203. Delaney & Magraw, supra note 188, at 778.
204. Id. (footnote omitted).
205. See INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 4.
206. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28.14.
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instance, arbitration costs remain high with averages of about $8-10
million and amounts as high as over $30 million.20 7 Any host state losing
in ISDS arbitrations will also be liable for hefty damage awards in
addition to suffering from reputation loss vis-a-vis both states and foreign
investors.20 s For developing countries, such awards will undoubtedly
take away the money that could have been spent on addressing other
competing, and at times more important, public needs.209
In addition, transnational corporations will have opportunities to
directly challenge regulations in host states in the developing world
without the assistance or intervention of their home governments. 210
Regulatory chill therefore remains a wide and continuous concern,
not to mention the largely unsettled debate concerning whether the
special carve-out for tobacco control measures in Article 29.5 has
actually made it better or worse for host states to defend legitimate
regulations not specifically identified by the TPP Agreement.211
207. See Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 98, at 19; Hodgson, supra note 98, at 749.
208. As Kyla Tienhaara observed,
In addition to the legal costs and fees associated with investment arbitration
(which may be awarded to one party or divided between the parties), there is
also the reputational effect that investor-State disputes have. Allee and
Peinhardt have found that the existence of arbitral proceedings against a
government, regardless of the eventual outcome of the dispute, has a
negative impact on the State's reputation in the eyes of foreign investors.
Their data suggests that States are likely to receive less foreign direct
investment following an investor's lodging of a BIT claim. Other possible
negative impacts that could worry a host government faced with a dispute
include strained relations with the government of the investor's home State
(which may be an important trading partner or provider of financial aid)
and/or with the World Bank.
Tienhaara, supra note 132, at 613.
209. These needs include
purification of water, generation of power, improvement of public health,
reduction of child mortality, provision of education, promotion of public
security, building of basic infrastructure, reduction of violent crimes, relief of
poverty, elimination of hunger, promotion of gender equality, protection of
the environment and response to terrorism, illegal arms sales, human and
drug trafficking, illegal immigration and corruption.
Peter K Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPOJ. 1, 3-4 (2010).
210. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.19.
211. While the carve-out has made clear the exemption of tobacco control
measures from ISDS, it could undermine the efforts to exempt other equally
important but unspecified regulations. See Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare?,
supra note 167, at 272-75 (discussing the difficulties in creating a carve-out for
tobacco control measures at the TPP negotiations); Sean Flynn, TPP Carve out for
Tobacco Shows Core Flaws in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), INFOJUSTICE.ORG
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Within the intellectual property area, the ISDS mechanism will
enable intellectual property rights holders to push for protection not yet
covered by the TRIPS Agreement. Thus far, many host states have been
actively avoiding additional intellectual property obligations under
TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements. Yet
the broad definition of covered investment may allow intellectual
property rights holders to use ISDS to demand higher standards of
intellectual property protection and enforcement even when those
standards are not required. If ISDS-based strategies prove successful,
developed country governments and multinational corporations may
become more eager to rewrite international intellectual property rules
outside the usual multilateral fora, such as the WTO and WLPO. 12
IV. MODEST PROPOSALS
The previous Part discusses both the substantive and procedural
safeguards that the TPP Agreement has instituted to address ISDS-
related concerns. The TPP still has many weaknesses, however, and
this Part proposes two sets of improvements to address them. The first
set consists of conceptual improvements, covering all forms of
investments, including those in the intellectual property field. The
second set contains institutional improvements. These improvements
are important to the ISDS mechanism in not only the TPP Agreement
but also other international trade or investment agreements. While
many of the conceptual and institutional improvements discussed in
this Part can be introduced without modifying the TPP Agreement,
others may require at least some modification.
A. Conceptual Improvements
The first set of improvements consists of those aiming to
strengthen our ability to conceptualize investments in the proper
context. Because intellectual property rights are intangible and
(Oct. 1, 2015), http://infojustice.org/archives/35107 (criticizing the inadequacy of
the TPP carve-out for tobacco control measures).
212. See Yu, Non-Multilateral Approach, supra note 4 (discussing efforts to set
international intellectual property norms outside the traditional multilateral fora).
For further discussions of what commentators have referred to as the "country club"
approach to international intellectual property norm-setting, see generally Daniel
Gervais, Country Clubs, Empiricism, Blogs and Innovation: The Future of International
Intellectual Property Norm Making in the Wake of ACTA, in TRADE GOvERNANCE IN THE
DIGITAL AGE: WORLD TRADE FORUM 323 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012);
Peter K. Yu, The ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND
KNOWLEDGE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND KNOWLEDGE
GOVERNANCE 258 (Dana Beldiman ed., 2014).
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elusive by nature, 2  having proper conceptualization is especially
significant in the intellectual property field. Such conceptualization
is also important given the hitherto limited attention to the interplay
of intellectual property and investment law.214
Just as investment issues are new to those in the intellectual
property field, intellectual property issues are also new to those in the
investment field. For example, investment law experts may not be
fully knowledgeable about the many complexities and nuances within
intellectual property law and policy. Likewise, intellectual property
law experts may be unfamiliar with the tradition and unique language
of investment law, such as "direct and indirect expropriation of
property," "minimum standard of treatment," "fair and equitable
treatment," and "full protection and security."215
To a large extent, the linkage between intellectual property and
investment reminds us of the earlier challenges confronting the
incorporation of intellectual property rights into the trade regime in
the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 21 1 Such linkage also brings to
213. See Marshall Leaffer, Character Merchandising in the UK, a Nostalgic Look, 11 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 453, 454 (1994) (noting that "unlike physical property-
land or chattels-intangible property, by its very nature, has vague boundaries"); Peter
S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 63, 67-68
(2002) (noting that copyright law is "a notoriously complex and subtle body of law").
214. See Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant, supra note 31, at 871-72 ("While
existing literature on international investment agreements .. . and investor-state
dispute settlement is both rich and diverse the relative absence of literature
reviewing and analyzing the legal requirements and potential effect of intellectual
property ... provisions in [international investment agreements] is striking. The
absence of scholarly attention is even more surprising given the voluminous
literature on IP chapters of [free trade agreements].").
215. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.6.1 ("Each Party shall accord to
covered investments treatment in accordance with applicable customary
international law principles, including fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security."); id. art. 9.6.2 (defining "fair and equitable treatment" to
include "the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or administrative
adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied
in the principal legal systems of the world" and "full protection and security" as
"requir[ing] each Party to provide the level of police protection required under
customary international law").
216. As I noted in the context of teaching international intellectual property law
in the post-TRIPS era,
The entering into effect of the TRIPs Agreement has also brought to the
field many teachers who have taught or researched in the areas of public
international law, international organizations, international trade, or
international business transactions. Those teachers therefore may not be
interested in teaching the course as an intellectual property law course
alone. Being "migrants" or "visitors," they also may not have the standard
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mind the discourse on intellectual property and human rights in the
late 1990s and the early 2000s. 217 At that time, many "transnational
corporations and their supporting developed countries ... [have
found] alien the human rights language and the forum structure. "218
The same challenges exist today when intellectual property and
investment are discussed together.1
This Section will outline three sets of conceptual improvements.
The first set is specifically related to intellectual property protection.
It calls for a deeper inquiry concerning the investment-related aspects
of intellectual property rights. The second and third sets are not as
directly related but are still substantially related to intellectual
property protection. While the second set calls for a more
sophisticated understanding of the limited role of such protection in
the investment environment, the final set underscores the need to
interpret intellectual property provisions in international trade or
investment agreements by reference to other multilateral agreements
as well as national jurisprudence.
1. What constitutes investment?
A critical question concerning the investment-related aspects of
intellectual property rights is what constitutes investment.220 This
experience or background expected from intellectual property law experts.
As a result, these teachers are more likely to see the course as one that will
help students better understand the changing global legal environment, the
international and regional lawmaking processes, and techniques for
resolving cross-border disputes.
Peter K Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 923,
941-42 (2008).
217. For the Author's earlier articles on intellectual property and human rights,
see Peter K Yu, Digital Copyright Enforcement Measures and Their Human Rights Threats,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HuMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 455
(Christophe Geiger ed., 2015) [hereinafter RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTs];
Peter K Yu, The Anatomy of the Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 69 SMU L.
REv. 37 (2016); Peter K Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral
Era, 64 FIA. L. REV. 1045 (2012); Peter K Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Prnperty Interests
in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1039 (2007) [hereinafter Yu,
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests]; Peter K Yu, Ten Common Questions About
Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 709 (2007).
218. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 217, at 1136.
219. See Biadgleng, supra note 53, at 32 ("IP issues have their own dimension,
jurisprudence and political economy completely different from investment.").
220. For discussions of ways to identify an investment within the meaning of
international investment agreements, see generally Jan Asmus Bischoff & Richard
Happ, The Notion of Investment, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw HANDBOOK, Supra
note 30, at 495; Emmanuel Gaillard, Identify or Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the
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question is highly complicated because most international investment
agreements have a broad definition of covered investment. For
instance, Article 9.1 of the TPP Agreement defines "investment" as
"every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that
has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics
as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of
gain or profit, or the assumption of risk."' 21 Article 9.1 further states
that "[f]orms that an investment may take include... intellectual
property rights,"222 without providing any definition of those rights.
The TPP investment chapter, however, does not further delineate
the coverage of "intellectual property rights." Instead, these rights are
defined in Article 18.1, which states that "intellectual property refers to
all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1
through 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement."22 ' Because Article 18.1 is
not part of the investment chapter, one could argue against applying
this definition to the chapter. Regardless of its applicability, however, an
important inquiry can be made about what rights are covered as
investments within the meaning of the TPP investment chapter.
However broad the coverage is, intellectual property rights should
not be automatically equated with covered investments once they
emerge or have been acquired in the host state.22 ' After all, many of
Concept of Investment in ICSID Practice, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw, supra note
76, at 403; David A.R. Williams & Simon Foote, Recent Developments in the Approach to
Identifying an "Investment" Pursuant to Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, in
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 127, at 42.
221. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.1.
222. Id. (including "intellectual property rights" under subsection (f) of the
definition of "investment").
223. Id. art. 18.1.
224. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Investment Law and Intellectual Property Rights,
in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 1692, 1696 ("The
fact that BITs and [free trade agreements] include IPRs as a form of investment . .. is
merely the starting point for analysing how and when IPRs are protected by the
general guarantees provided to investors in these agreements."); Correa & Vifiuales,
supra note 183, at 112 ("[T]he acquisition of IPRs does not imply the assumption of
any risk. Even when registration is required, the applicant does not expose its capital
to any loss. It simply asserts rights against third parties who would be thereafter
excluded from the use of the protected subject matter."); Okediji, Is Intellectual
Property "Investment"?, supra note 25, at 1125-26 ("At a minimum, a determination
that an intellectual property rights owner is also an investor cannot plausibly be
based solely on acquiring rights, particularly since member states of the WTO have
no choice but to accord such rights, and to do so on the terms set by the TRIPS
Agreement."). See generally VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 7-33 (discussing
whether intellectual property and related rights would qualify as investments).
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these rights can exist without any actual investments into that state.
As Ruth Okediji reminded us,
Intellectual property rights can be held simultaneously in many
countries and in some cases, like copyright, without any formalities
or other domestic process that would indicate a specific investment
purpose. Is merely having authorial works in circulation in a host
country sufficient to constitute an "investment in a given country?"
Similarly, where patent rights are acquired by mere registration,
such as in many least-developed countries, should this alone confer
the status of an "investment"? Should requirements of local
working conditions that more firmly anchor the patent grant to
domestic priorities make a difference in an assessment of a
protected investment?225
In fact, if intellectual property rights acquired in the host state can
automatically become investments regardless of whether investments
have actually been made in the first place, 2 many of the safeguards
and adjustments provided by the TRIPS Agreement will be
immediately lost. As Bryan Mercurio cautioned, "If ownership of an
IPR is an 'investment', the question becomes whether a compulsory
225. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"?, supra note 25, at 1125.
226. As the tribunal in Bayview Irrigation District v. United Mexican States declared,
[I]n order to be an "investor" within the meaning of NAFTA Art. 1101 (a),
an enterprise must make an investment in another NAFTA State, and not in
its own. Adopting the terminology of the Methanex v. United States Tribunal,
it is necessary that the measures of which complaint is made should affect an
investment that has a "legally significant connection" with the State creating
and applying those measures. The simple fact that an enterprise in one
NAFTA State is affected by measures taken in another NAFTA State is not
sufficient to establish the right of that enterprise to protection under NAFTA
Chapter Eleven: it is the relationship, the legally significant connection, with
the State taking those measures that establishes the right to protection, not
the bare fact that the enterprise is affected by the measures.
Bayview Irrigation Dist. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/1,
Award, 1 101 (June 19, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblobs/onli
neawards/C246/DC653_En.pdf; see also ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade
Agreement art. 2(d) n.4, ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand, Feb. 27, 2009,
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/aanzfta/official-documents/Pages/agreement
-establishing-the-asean-australia-new-zealand-free-trade-area-aanzfta.aspx ("[T] he
Parties understand that an investor that 'seeks to make' an investment refers to an
investor of another Party that has taken active steps to make an investment."); Correa
& Vifluales, supra note 183, at 114 ("Chapter 11 of the NAFTA is not intended to
protect a company's activities as a foreign exporter of goods into the territory of a
NAFTA Party. The same reasoning would apply in a case where a patent, trademark
or other IPR were not associated with a presence in the host country that could be
qualified as an investment." (footnote omitted)).
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license can be an expropriation of that investment."2 ' Given the
high stakes involved, it is important to develop analytical frameworks
that can be used to determine whether investments have been made
within the meaning of the TPP investment chapter or other
international investment agreements. This question is important
because the issuance of compulsory licenses is at the heart of the
negotiations surrounding the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health."
One test that has garnered considerable support from
commentators2 . is the one adopted in Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v.
Kingdom of Morocco,"' a case involving the construction of a Moroccan
highway by Italian contractors.'31 This test took into consideration
four distinct factors: "[1] contributions, [2] a certain duration of
performance of the contract ... [3] a participation in the risks of the
transaction ... [and] [4] the contribution to the economic
development of the host State of the investment."23 2 Applied to the
intellectual property context, Lukas Vanhonnaeker translated these
factors as follows:
227. Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant, supra note 31, at 911. For discussions
of the interplay between compulsory licenses and international investment
agreements, see generally VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 47-68; Correa, Investment
Protection, supra note 52; Gibson, supra note 87; Lin Tsai-Yu, Compulsory Licenses for
Access to Medicines, Expropriation and Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment
Agreements-Are There Issues Beyond the TRIPS Agreement?, 40 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 152 (2009); Peter B. Rutledge, TRIPS and BITs: An Essay on
Compulsory Licenses, Expropriation, and International Arbitration, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
ONLINE 149 (2012).
228. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, Nov. 14, 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002); see
also Yu, International Enclosure Movement, supra note 56, at 872-86 (discussing the
negotiations surrounding the Doha Declaration).
229. See Gaillard, supra note 220, at 403 (describing Salini as "[a]n important
milestone in the evolution of the ICSID case law on the notion of investment");
Correa & Vifiuales, supra note 183, at 100 n.30 (describing Salini as providing the
"most influential precedent" concerning qualifications to a broad definition of
"investment"); Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"?, supra note 25, at 1137 ("A
[possible] approach is to require a complainant to establish that its intellectual
property rights have had a clear economic benefit to the host country and thus
constitutes an 'investment.' One key factor in such an 'investment test' could be
requiring the claimant to establish the significance of the intellectual property to the
host State's economic development.").
230. ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 31, 2001), 6 ICSID
Rep. 400 (2004).
231. Id. 11.
232. Id. ¶ 52.
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(i) IP is susceptible to be invested for a certain duration; (ii) it is
likely to generate profit and return on a regular basis; (iii) IP, and
more precisely, IPRs "share the unique and constant risk of
infringement by third parties not privileged in their use"; (iv) IP
investment often represents a substantial commitment; and (v)
such assets have a significant potential to contribute to the Host
State's development.233
Apart from developing analytical frameworks to determine whether
investments have been made within the meaning of the international
investment agreement concerned, it is also important to recall the
contingent nature of intellectual property rights.23 4  Just because
these rights have been granted does not mean that they can be
enforced through the international investment agreement. There
are at least four reasons for such non-enforcement.
The first reason concerns the limited duration of intellectual
property rights. The international standard for copyright protection
provided by both the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement is
the life of the author plus fifty years. When the copyright term is not
calculated based on the author's life, the TRIPS Agreement fixes that
term at a minimum of fifty years.3  For trademark protection, the
Agreement sets the term of both initial registration and subsequent
renewal to a minimum of seven years.23 ' For patent protection, the
Agreement stipulates that such protection "shall not end before the
expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.""
The TPP Agreement extends the minimum terms in all three areas.
Article 18.63 increases the protection of copyright and related rights
233. VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 26 (footnotes omitted).
234. See Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"?, supra note 25, at 1126 ("[A]ll
intellectual property rights are to some extent contingent rights only; whether a
claimant is a rightful owner, has complied with national eligibility standards for
protection, whether there are any applicable subject-matter limits or supervening
policy considerations, or whether a granting agency has appropriately granted (or
denied) such rights are always subject to question before national courts.").
235. See Berne Convention, supra note 39, art. 7(1); TRIPS Agreement, supra note
2, art. 9 ("Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne
Convention....").
236. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 12 ("Whenever the term of
protection of a work, other than a photographic work or a work of applied art, is
calculated on a basis other than the life of a natural person, such term shall be no
less than 50 years from the end of the calendar year of authorized publication, or,
failing such authorized publication within 50 years from the making of the work, 50
years from the end of the calendar year of making.").
237. See id. art. 18.
238. Id. art. 33.
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to the life of the author plus seventy years." When the copyright
term is not calculated based on the author's life, the TPP Agreement
extends the term to a minimum of seventy years. 240 For trademark
protection, Article 18.26 increases the terms of both initial registration
and subsequent renewal to a minimum of ten years,241 matching the
terms found in the United States.242 For patent protection, Article
18.46 allows for an adjustment of the patent term based on
unreasonable delay on the part of the patent office .2" This adjustment
achieves the same effect as the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 in the
United States, which provides for a limited extension of the patent
term.24  Notwithstanding these extensions, all the intellectual property
terms identified in the TPP Agreement remain limited in duration.
The second reason pertains to renewal or maintenance fees, which
are required for trademark and patent protections in most jurisdictions,
including the United States. Although the TRIPS Agreement allows
trademarks to be "renewed indefinitely,"24 5 section 9 of the Lanham Act
allows "each registration ... [to] be renewed for periods of 10 years at
the end of each successive 10-year period following the date of
registration upon payment of the prescribed fee and the filing of a written
application."246 Similarly, to maintain protection in the United States,
patent holders are required to pay maintenance fees "three times during
the life of a patent, and may be paid without surcharge at 3 to 3.5 years,
7 to 7.5 years, and 11 to 11.5 years after the date of issue."247
Given these renewal or maintenance requirements, intellectual
property rights holders will have to take proactive actions to ensure
that their protection remains in effect. Just because their rights have
239. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 18.63(a).
240. See id. art. 18.63(b).
241. See id. art. 18.26.
242. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (2012) ("Each registration shall remain in force for
10 years. . . ."); id. § 1059(a) ("[E]ach registration may be renewed for periods of 10
years at the end of each successive 10-year period following the date of registration
upon payment of the prescribed fee and the filing of a written application . ).
243. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 18.46.
244. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, § 156, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
245. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 18.
246. 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
247. Maintain Your Patent, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/pat
ents-maintaining-patent/maintain-your-patent (last visited Feb. 5, 2017); see also id.
("A maintenance fee is a fee that is required for maintaining in force all utility and
reissue utility patents based on applications filed on or after December 12, 1980 ....
If a maintenance fee is not paid the patent protection lapses and the rights provided
by a patent are no longer enforceable.").
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been initially granted does not mean that they will enjoy the full
protection for the entire duration of an international investment
agreement. Indeed, some patent researchers, especially those in
economics or other non-law fields, have mistaken the TRIPS term of
twenty years as a proxy for the length of patent protection. Yet " [i] t is
pointless to assume that the length of [such] protection to be a static
20 years without taking into consideration maintenance or renewal
fees and potential regulatory delays."2 18
The third reason relates to the potential subsequent invalidation of
protected rights, even if those rights have been initially granted in the
first place. 249  This contingency is particularly salient in the ISDS
proceeding Eli Lilly filed against Canada, which concerned two
patents that the Canadian courts have subsequently invalidated
despite the initial grants. 25 0  Although such invalidations seem
problematic from a property standpoint, the non-exclusive and non-
excludable nature of intellectual property rights has made these
rights an ill fit for an analysis based on traditional property rights. 2 5 '
Also complicating this analysis is that, unlike in most claims of
direct expropriation of real or other tangible property, the ownership
of intellectual property rights has not been transferred to Canada;
instead, the drugs are now in the public domain, free for anybody to
copy.252 In expropriation cases, seeking compensation from the
government concerned is logical because that government has
obtained direct financial benefits. In intellectual property disputes,
however, the government did not receive similar benefits. Instead, it
merely performed the statutory duty of determining whether the
248. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, supra note 209, at 8-9; see alsoJeremy
Phillips, "I Wouldn't Want to Be Starting from Here," or Why Isn't Intellectual Property
Research Better than It Is?, 1 WIPOJ. 138, 140 (2009) (noting the mistaken claim that
"it was 'common knowledge' that patents lasted for 20 years," without regard to
either jurisdiction or renewal procedures).
249. See Ho, supra note 22, at 243 ("Intellectual property rights are different than
other types of property because they can be and often are later canceled. The
cancellation of the rights means there were no legitimate rights to begin with, so in
these cases there should be no recognized investment that would trigger the ability
to file an investor-state dispute.").
250. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2,
Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 12, 2013), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblo
bs/onlineawards/c3544/dc4612_En.pdf; see supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
251. For discussions of the non-rivalrous and non-excludable nature of intellectual
property, see generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 344-61 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1033-46 (2005).
252. See Ho, supra note 22, at 263.
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applicant of an intellectual property right has met eligibility
requirements, 2 such as the patentability requirement as qualified by
the Canadian "promise doctrine. "254
Moreover, patent rights have been invalidated more often than one
would expect. In a widely cited study published in the late 1990s,
John Allison and Mark Lemley showed that U.S. courts had found a
challenged patent invalid in 46% of the 300 final validity decisions
examined..2 " A few years ago, Carlos Correa also observed,
In the US... , patent owner's likelihood of success in patent
validity challenges is only 51 per cent if the trial is heard before a
judge alone. If the trial is heard before a judge and jury: 68 per
cent. Overall chances of success for the patent owner if the trial is
held in Massachusetts and Northern California, respectively: 30
per cent, 68 per cent.256
Indeed, the widely documented patent quality problem in the United
States sparked repeated calls for patent reform,' 5  which eventually
resulted in a complete overhaul of the U.S. patent system through the
adoption of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 58 in September 2011.
If these criticisms indeed reflected the problems of the U.S. patent
system-a system that is far more developed than the systems in many
other countries-one has to wonder whether mere patent invalidations
would provide adequate support for an ISDS complaint.
253. See id. at 243 ("[U] nlike most forms of real property, which exist without state
intervention, some types of intellectual property only exist if granted by the state ....
For example, a patent right does not exist without a state agency such as the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office reviewing an application to evaluate whether a patent
is deserved." (footnote omitted)).
254. See supra text accompanying note 22.
255. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).
256. Carlos M. Correa, The Push for Stronger Enforcement Rules: Implications for
Developing Countries, in INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEv., THE GLOBAL DEBATE
ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
27, 67-68 n.84 (2009), http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/2012/02/
the-global-debate-on-the-enforcement-of-intellectual-property-rights-and-developing-
countries.pdf.
257. For discussions of problems within the U.S. patent system before the
adoption of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, see generally U.S. FED. TRADE
COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2004); A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004).
258. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
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The final reason involves limits on intellectual property rights both
within and outside the system. Endogenous limits are those
constraints that have been internalized within the intellectual
property system.2 19  Although those new to the intellectual property
field, including many ISDS arbitrators, tend to focus only on
protections, limitations and exceptions are just as important as the
rights themselves. 2 o Among the widely cited endogenous constraints
are those concerning fair use;26' exhaustion of rights;26 2 exceptions
for research or experimental use,26 ' early working,264 and the
development of diagnostics;265 as well as special arrangements for
compulsory licensing, parallel importation, and government use.266
259. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (underscoring the various
"built-in First Amendment accommodations" in existing copyright law); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (stating that the Framers of
the Constitution "intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression").
260. SeeJAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SoFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 138 (1996); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
5 (1966) (noting that the intellectual property clause "is both a grant of power and a
limitation"). For an important study on limitations and exceptions, see generally P.
BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON
LIMITATIONs AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT (2008), http://www.ivir.nl/
publicaties/download/limitations exceptions.copyright.pdf.
261. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
262. See, e.g., id. § 109(a) (codifying the first sale doctrine).
263. See Karin Timmermans, Ensuring Access to Medicines in 2005 and Beyond, in
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 54, at 41, 52 (noting the need for "a research
exemption"). For discussions of the experimental use exemption, see generally
Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIz. L. REV. 457 (2004); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1017 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental
Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1
(2001); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 81.
264. See COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 50 (2002) (discussing the importance of
the Bolar exception, which "makes it legal for a generic producer to import,
manufacture and test a patented product prior to the expiry of the patent in order
that it may fulfill the regulatory requirements imposed by particular countries as
necessary for marketing as a generic").
265. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27.3(a) ("Members may. . . exclude from
patentability ... diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of
humans or animals .... ); EDSON BEAS RODRIGuESJR., THE GENERAL EXCEPTION CLAUSES
OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 159-236 (2012)
(discussing the research-and-development and genetic diagnostic test exceptions).
266. See ELLEN F.M. 'T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY
POWER: DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE APPLICATION OF THE WTO DOHA
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Limits on intellectual property rights can also be found outside the
intellectual property system. Widely cited exogenous limits include
those constraints found in human rights treaties, 6 7 constitutions,2 6 8
competition law, 6 or in relation to "morality, public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society. "270 Exogenous limits are
DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 39-59 (2009) (discussing compulsory
licenses and parallel importation in relation to the flexibilities provided by the TRIPS
Agreement).
267. See Carlos M. Correa, Mitigating the Impact of Intellectual Property in Developing
Countries Through the Implementation of Human Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 217, at 201, 208-11 (discussing the use of human rights
obligations to mitigate the impact of high intellectual property standards in
developing countries); HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE
CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 229-55 (2007) (discussing TRIPS
flexibilities in relation to the protection of human rights); Geertrui Van Overwalle,
Human Rights' Limitations in Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A PARADOx 236 (Willem Grosheide ed., 2010) (discussing the human rights
limitations in patent law); Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note
217, at 1096-99 (discussing compulsory licensing based on human rights).
268. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. For excellent discussions of the relationship
between copyright law and the First Amendment, see generally sources cited in Peter
K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 907, 927 n.145 (2004).
269. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion & Prot. of
Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights on Human Rights: Report of the High Commissioner, 1 64, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) ("The High Commissioner encourages
States to consider the elaboration of competition laws that prevent abuses of IPRs
that lead to violations of the right to health-in particular restrictive licensing
practices or the setting of high prices for essential drugs."); Jonathan Berger,
Advancing Public Health by Other Means: Using Competition Policy, in NEGOTIATING
HEALTH, supra note 54, at 181, 182 (exploring how developing countries can use
competition policy to "increase access to a sustainable supply of affordable essential
medicines"); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Governments
and for Private Business: A "Trade Law Approach"for Linking Trade and Competition Rules
in the WTO, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 545, 563 (1996) ("[D]eveloping countries with
underdeveloped national competition and intellectual property rights laws ... will
need more systematic rules on the protection of competition among trade-related
intellectual property rights and on the prevention of their anticompetitive abuse.");
J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 52-58 (1997) (proposing to use
"competition law to curb the abuse of market power" as a pro-competitive strategy for
implementing the TRIPS Agreement in developing countries).
270. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 29(2)
(Dec. 10, 1948) ("In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society."); see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into forceJan. 3, 1976)
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important because they remind investors of their social responsibilities.
As Kate Miles observed, "there is a need for more balanced international
investment agreements that retain strong investor protection but impose
corresponding levels of investor responsibility."271
When both endogenous and exogenous limits are taken into
account, the intellectual property rights available under the
international investment agreement may be more limited than what
the three words "intellectual property rights" have suggested in the
definition of covered investment. As far as international investment
obligations are concerned, circumstances may also exist to preclude
findings of violations. These circumstances include necessity, force
majeure, and countermeasures taken to address actual and alleged
breaches of international law by the investors' home states.
2. Intellectual property protection and the investment environment
The previous Section underscores the need to undertake a deeper
inquiry into what constitutes investment. This Section turns to the
need for a more sophisticated understanding of the role of
intellectual property protection in an investment environment.
Although there is a tendency to emphasize the role of such
protection in attracting FDI, policymakers and commentators have
("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of
those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State
may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so
far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the
purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society."); Convention on
the Grant of European Patents art. 53(a), Oct. 5, 1973, as amended by Decision of the
Administration Council of the European Patent Organization of Dec. 21, 1978, 1065
U.N.T.S. 255 ("European patents shall not be granted in respect of ... inventions the
commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to 'ordre public' or
morality...."); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27.2 ("Members may exclude
from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial
exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality. . . .").
271. Miles, supra note 109, at 296; see also Jacqueline Lipton, Information Propery:
Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 165 (2004) ("If information property
rights are here to stay, we should consider ways in which responsibilities of property
ownership can be developed and imposed on right holders as part of our legal
system."). For discussions of investors' responsibilities, see generally Peter
Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at 637;
Karsten Nowrot, Obligations of Investors, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw
HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 1154.
272. See Christina Binder, Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 442 (discussing the circumstances that
may preclude findings of violations of international investment agreements).
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widely questioned whether strong intellectual property protection
actually causes greater FDI flows.27 3
To date, economists have provided an abundance of empirical
studies demonstrating the ambiguity of this causal relationship.7
For example, Claudio Frischtak states that a country's overall
investment climate is often more influential on FDI decisions than
the strength of intellectual property protection it offers. 7 Carsten
Fink and Keith Maskus observed that "[a] poor country hoping to
attract inward FDI would be better advised to improve its overall
investment climate and business infrastructure than to strengthen its
patent regime sharply, an action that would have little effect on its
own." Professor Maskus further stated that, if stronger intellectual
property protection always led to more FDI, "recent FDI flows to
developing economies would have gone largely to sub-Saharan Africa
and Eastern Europe ... [rather than] China, Brazil, and other high-
growth, large-market developing economies with weak IPRs." "2
As if these studies were not enough, policymakers and
commentators have questioned whether intellectual property
protection should be strengthened indefinitely regardless of the local
contexts. Indeed, there is no guarantee that stronger protection will
promote further creativity and innovation even if the existing level of
protection is needed to incentivize such creativity and innovation. As
Judge Alex Kozinski warned us in his famous dissent in White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. ,'27 "Overprotecting intellectual
273. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 176-77 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st
ed. 2007) ("Conventional wisdom holds that strong intellectual property protection
is needed to attract foreign investment . . .. However, recent empirical research
questions this conventional wisdom.").
274. See generally id. at .176-80 (reviewing the economic literature that discusses
this ambiguous relationship).
275. See Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in Intellectual
Property Right Regimes, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 89, 99-100 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993)
(noting that the nature of a country's intellectual property regime was traditionally a
secondary concern in a company's FDI decision).
276. Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus, Why We Study Intellectual Property Rights and
What We Have Learned, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 7 (Carsten
Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005).
277. Maskus, Role of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 57, at 128-29 (footnotes
omitted).
278. 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,J., dissenting).
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property is as harmful as underprotecting it."279  Likewise, Josh
Lerner wrote, "Almost all economists would agree that some
intellectual property protection is better than no intellectual property
protection at all. But this does not mean that very strong protection
is better than a more moderate level of protection."2 80
To develop a more sophisticated understanding of investment
protection, it is important to examine protection from the sides of
both the investor and the host state. On either side, adjustments may
have been made to increase or decrease the overall level of
protection the host state has provided to the investor. Unfortunately,
this type of complementary protection is generally not the focus of
any inquiry into the level of intellectual property protection.
Consider, for instance, the evaluation of the moral rights
protection offered to a foreign investor-artist in the United States.
Thus far, policymakers and commentators have repeatedly noted that
the country's limited protection"8 " can be enhanced by laws relating to
unfair competition, breach of contract, defamation, and the right to
privacy."' Yet those criticizing the United States for its failure to fully
comply with the moral rights provision of the Berne Convention28 1
remain reluctant to recognize these substitutes. The critics' narrower
focus is understandable considering that the inquiry mostly concerns
intellectual property rights-or, more specifically, copyright and
related rights. As important as the protections offered by defamation
laws and the right to privacy are, they are simply not part of the
intellectual property system. Nevertheless, the analysis would be
279. Id. at 1513.
280. Josh Lerner, The Patent System in a Time of Turmoil, 2 WIPOJ. 28, 32 (2010); see
also Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 13,
17 (2006) ("[M]ore [copyright protection] is not always better, and small can be
beautiful.").
281. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (limiting the rights
of attribution and integrity to a narrowly defined set of works of visual art).
282. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1, 17-33 (1985) (discussing the non-copyright
alternatives U.S. courts relied upon before the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990 to protect a creator's moral rights, such as "unfair competition, breach of
contract, defamation, and invasion of privacy"); see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of
Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 665, 665 (1992) ("A common device for privatizing
speech is copyright; privatization can similarly be achieved using § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act and such common law doctrines as trade secrets, rights of privacy and
publicity, and unfair trade practices." (footnotes omitted)).
283. See Berne Convention, supra note 39, art. 6bis (providing the rights of
attribution and integrity).
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different if the inquiry were not about what intellectual property rights
had been offered but what rights-of whatever kind-had been
offered to protect intellectual property investments. To answer this
reframed question, one would have to consider protection from both
inside and outside the intellectual property system.
On the investor's side, it is therefore important to consider both
additive and subtractive adjustments. Additive adjustments are those
adjustments that will enhance the overall protection of intellectual
property investments. A case in point is the protection offered by a
food and drug administration. When such an administration links
the registration of pharmaceutical products to their patent status-a
common requirement in TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade agreements"'-the overall protection provided by
the host state to pharmaceutical investments will be stronger than the
protection of pharmaceutical patents alone. This additional
protection was indeed why commentators and civil society
organizations have been highly critical of the demands for this type of
linkage in TRIPS-plus trade agreements."'
By contrast, subtractive adjustments are those adjustments that will
undermine the overall protections given to intellectual property
investments. Typical examples are safeguards provided outside the
intellectual property system, such as those exogenous limits discussed
in the previous Section." A case in point is a process withholding
patent protection from a pharmaceutical product until after health
and medical experts have assessed its contribution to innovation and
284. See, e.g., Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art.
17.10.4, May 18, 2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/aus
tralian-fta/final-text; Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement
art. 15.10.2, May 28, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text; Singapore-
United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.8.4, May 6, 2003,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text.
285. As Carlos Correa observed,
The patent-registration linkage ignores that patents are private rights, as
stated in the Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement, and that, whether a given
product infringes or not, a patent is a legal matter entirely separate from the
technical issues concerning safety and efficacy of drugs. Health authorities
have no knowledge or experience whatsoever to assess the claims of a patent.
Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System for Access
to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 79, 88-91 (2004). Professor Correa further
criticized the patent-registration linkage for "creat[ing] a presumption of validity of
pharmaceutical product patents which health authorities are neither empowered nor
have the capacity to challenge." Id. at 91.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 267-71.
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health welfare, such as the prior consent mechanism (anuincia privia)
instituted by the Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency
(ANVISA). Although commentators have extolled the agency's
effort in fostering coordination between patent offices and health
and medical experts," there is no denying that this mechanism has
also weakened the overall protection offered to intellectual property
investments. Indeed, by October 2010, the conflicts between ANVISA
and the Brazilian industrial property agency" had become so intense
that the country's attorney general (Advocacia Geral da Uniao) felt
compelled to step in to curtail ANVISA's role.29 o
Just as it is important to evaluate the protection given to the
investor, it is equally significant to examine the protection provided
by the host state. In regard to the latter, ISDS arbitrators should
consider the inputs the state has provided to investors as part of its
effort to protect intellectual property investments. Such
287. See Peter Drahos, "Trust Me": Patent Offices in Developing Countries, 34 AM. J.L.
& MED. 151, 169-70 (2008) (discussing ANVISA's prior consent mechanism).
288. For example, Peter Drahos declared,
The Brazilian model is worth close study by other developing countries. It is
a preventive strategy that avoids the high costs of attempting to remove
patents that have been granted. It is also an integrative regulatory strategy.
It links patentability criteria in the area of pharmaceuticals to the goal of
welfare-enhancing innovation in the health sector. One of the real concerns
with pharmaceutical patenting has been that patent offices are granting
patents over essentially trivial steps in the innovation process. The reasons
for this are complex, having to do with the incentives facing patent offices,
the narrow training of patent examiners, the fact that patent examiners are
not researchers, and that they are not integrated into communities of public
health experts that know about what constitutes real innovation in a given
field. From the perspective of the patent social contract, the grant of patents
over trivial or obvious steps in the pharmaceutical innovation process
constitutes a welfare loss to society. Involving public health experts in the
process of patent administration is one way of helping to ensure that the
patent social contract functions as it should in the health sector.
Id. at 169-70 (footnotes omitted); see also Peter K Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances,
and Collective Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 378 (2008) (suggesting that the ANIVSA
model could be used to facilitate greater cooperation between intellectual property
offices in the South and health and medical experts and related NGOs in the North).
289. For discussions of this conflict, see generally Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Political
Contradictions of Incremental Innovation: Lessons from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination
in Brazil, 39 POL. & Soc'Y 143 (2011); Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Rise and Fall of "Prior
Consent" in Brazil, 3 WIPOJ. 103 (2011).
290. See Felipe Carvalho, Brazil and the Defence of Public Health: Do as I Say, Not as I
Do, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 17, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2011/02/17/brazil-and-the-defence-of-public-health-do-as-i-say-
not-as-i-do (reporting the October 2010 decision of the Advocacia Geral da Uniao that
undermined ANVISA's prior consent mechanism).
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consideration is especially important in inquiries concerning the
country's overall minimum standard of treatment.
As far as intellectual property investments are concerned, host
states contribute to their overall protections through inputs within
and outside the system. Those inputs that are within the system
include the establishment of registration, examination, and
enforcement infrastructures. Those outside the system include
concessions offered to compensate for weaker intellectual property
protections, such as free lands, tax breaks, exemption from export
custom duties, and preferential treatment on foreign exchange."
To be sure, the existence of concessional benefits outside the
intellectual property system does not reduce the host state's
obligation under an international investment agreement.
Nevertheless, ISDS arbitrators should take those benefits into account
if they are to obtain a more complete picture of what attracts foreign
intellectual property rights holders to invest in the first place. After
all, if intellectual property rights were as strong as the claimants
expected them to be, offsetting contributions would not have been
needed in the first place.
3. International investment agreements and other multilateral obligations
The final set of conceptual improvements concerns the
interrelationship between an international trade or investment
agreement containing ISDS, such as the TPP Agreement, and the
host state's other, and often preexisting, multilateral obligations.
These obligations include those under the TRIPS Agreement, the
291. See sources cited supra note 127.
292. For example, many transnational corporations outsource their operations to
China because of location advantages unrelated to intellectual property protection.
See Maskus, Role of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 57, at 128-29 (noting that, if
strong intellectual property protection and enforcement attracted foreign investors,
"recent FDI flows to developing economies would have gone largely to sub-Saharan
Africa and Eastern Europe ... [rather than] China, Brazil, and other high-growth,
large-market developing economies with weak IPRs" (footnotes omitted)); see also
CATHERINE SUN, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS 4-5 (2004)
(noting that many major Western companies, such as Coca-Cola, Kodak, Motorola,
and Procter & Gamble, have enjoyed substantial profits for years despite the
country's serious piracy and counterfeiting problems and that improvements in
intellectual property protection will merely "increas[e the] already acceptable profit
ratios," rather than providing profitability in the first place); Yu, From Pirates to
Partners II, supra note 88, at 983 ("[F]or those companies that have successfully
adapted to the local market environment, rampant piracy and counterfeiting
problems, though annoying, did not affect their ability to make profits.").
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Convention on Biological Diversity,9 3 the Nagoya Protocol on Access
to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits
Arising from Their Utilization," the World Health Organization
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control," and international and
regional human rights treaties.2 9 6
When efforts are needed to fill in the gap, ISDS arbitrators may
want to look at the developments in not only the host state and the
investor's home state but also third states. National laws can indeed
provide useful guideposts. In their book, Graeme Dinwoodie and
Rochelle Dreyfuss called for the recognition of an international
intellectual property acquis"'-which they defined as "a set of basic
principles that form the background norms animating the intellectual
property system."9" Aiming to clarify the normative underpinnings of
intellectual property law and policy, this acquis would draw from not
only international intellectual property treaties but also "national ...
intellectual property law along with associated jurisprudence and
scholarship."2 " As Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss explained,
[This acquis] would crystallize the international commitment to
intellectual property protection. It would include both express and
latent components of the international regime, put access-
regarding guarantees on a par with proprietary interests, and
enshrine the fundamental importance of national autonomy and
national treatment. Although it is unlikely that the intellectual
property system will ever be centrally administered in the manner
of a true federal system, the acquis would facilitate a neofederalist
293. Convention on Biological Diversity,June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
294. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization, Oct. 29, 2010, http://www.cbd.int
/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf.
295. World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
May 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S 166.
296. For discussions of the interplay between investment law and human rights,
see generally MoUYAL, supra note 76, at 140-57; Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Jorge E.
Vifluales, Human Rights and Investment Disciplines: Integration in Progress, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 1739; Bruno Simma &
Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human Rights: First
Steps Towards a Methodology, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw, supra note 76, at 678;
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Impact of Human Rights on International Investment Law
and Investor-State Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 76, at 877.
297. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFuss, A NEOFEDERALIST VIsIoN
OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
175-203 (2012).
298. Id. at 176.
299. Id. at 177.
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vision because it would coordinate international lawmaking while
giving due regard to the role of nation-states in that process.soo
To a large extent, the approach proposed in this Section is not that
different from what the TPP negotiators have already developed in
the investment chapter. For instance, Article 9.8.5 states that the
provision on expropriation and compensation
shall not apply to the issuance of compulsory licences granted in
relation to intellectual property rights in accordance with the
TRIPS Agreement, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of
intellectual property rights, to the extent that the issuance,
revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter 18
(Intellectual Property) and the TRIPS Agreement. 0
Article 9.3.1 further states that "[iln the event of any inconsistency
between this Chapter and another Chapter of this Agreement, the
other Chapter shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency. "302
Thus, if inconsistencies arise between the TPP investment and
intellectual property chapters, the latter shall prevail to the extent of
those inconsistencies.
Notwithstanding these similarities, the approach proposed in this
Section will take a holistic perspective. It will take into account the
many obligations the host state has already assumed under other
multilateral agreements.sos To make explicit the host state's duty to
interpret international agreements in good faith (pacta sunt servanda) ,04
TPP partners should consider writing into the ISDS arbitrators' code of
conduct a requirement that arbitrators consider a host state's broad
300. Id. at 203.
301. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.8.5.
302. Id. art. 9.3.1.
303. See Miles, supra note 109, at 296 ("There is ... a need for greater engagement
with principles from other areas of international law. Although international investment
agreements do not exist in a vacuum, the logical consequences of this appreciation are
not often embraced in arbitral awards or investment treaty negotiation. If they were, we
would already have seen the development of more socially and environmentally
responsible norms of international investment law-and more emphasis on protecting
the host state's right to regulate in the public interest."); Okediji, Is Intellectual Property
"Investment"?, supra note 25, at 1129 (noting that "an interpretation of NAFTA's
provisions must take place in the broader context of this network of treaties").
304. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith."); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
§ 321 (1987) ("Every international agreement in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith.").
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multilateral commitments. Such consideration can draw on the
principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.sos
B. Institutional Improvements
Section 1V.A identifies three sets of conceptual improvements that
are either directly or substantially related to intellectual property
investments. This Section turns to their institutional counterparts
that can help strengthen ISDS in regard to all forms of investments,
including those in the intellectual property field. This Section
discusses three institutional improvements in turn.
1. Advisory Center on Investor-State Disputes
The first institutional improvement concerns the need for an
Advisory Center on Investor-State Disputes ("ACISD"),so0 similar to
the Advisory Centre on WTO Law ("ACWL"). Based in Geneva, the
latter provides to the developing and least developed country
members of the WTO "free advice and training on all aspects of WTO
law, as well as assistance in WTO dispute settlement proceedings."so'
As the Centre explained in its guide,
Over the past 20 years, WrO law has become increasingly complex.
While most developed countries have "in-house" legal expertise
that enable [s] them to understand WTO law and to participate
fully in the WTO legal system, most developing countries and LDCs
[least developed countries] do not. Thus, the ACWL was created
305. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
For detailed discussions of the use of the Vienna Convention in TRIPS disputes, see
generally Susy Frankel, W/TO Application of "the Customay Rules ofInterpretation ofPublic
International Law" to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 384-90 (2006); Daya
Shanker, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Dispute Settlement System of the
WTO and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 721, 723-36
(2002).
306. Other commentators have advanced similar proposals. As Anna Joubin-Bret
recounted,
The idea to establish an international centre to provide advice and defence
services for states in international investment disputes is not new. It has
been proposed and discussed by several Latin American states following the
example of the successful Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) established
to provide advice and defence services to states in [WTO] disputes.
JouBiN-BRET, supra note 72, at 1; see also id. (calling for the establishment of an
International Advisory Centre for Investment Disputes to provide assistance in
defending investor-state disputes).
307. ADVISORY CENTRE ON WTO LAw, THE SERVICES OF THE ACWL 2 (n.d.),
http://www.acwl.ch/download/ql/Services-oftheACWL.pdf.
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to provide these countries with this legal capacity and to help them
to understand fully their rights and obligations under WTO law.
At present, 74 countries-roughly half of the membership of the
WTO-are entitled to the services of the ACWL. Since its
establishment in 2001, the ACWL has provided these countries with
over 1800 legal opinions free of charge, has conducted twelve
annual training courses for Geneva-based delegates, and has
trained 23 lawyers as part of its Secondment Programme for
Government lawyers. In addition, it has assisted developing
countries and LDCs in 44 VTO dispute settlement proceedings at
modest fees. Thus, the ACWL has become an organisation that
pools the collective experience of developing countries and LDCs
in WTO legal matters and makes that expertise available to each of
those countries.sos
In the past two decades, ACWL has provided assistance to a large
number of developing countries, including Bangladesh, Brazil, Chad,
Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam."o
Within the TPP, the establishment of an ACISD would be critically
important, considering the Agreement's failure to offer special and
differential treatment to poor TPP partners,"'o despite what
policymakers and commentators have long advocated. 1 1 After all, TPP
partners are of varying sizes and economic strengths. While the United
States and Japan had GDP per capita of $55,836.79 and $32,477.22 in
2015, respectively, the World Bank estimated that the comparable
figures for Peru and Vietnam were only $6027.13 and $2111.14,
308. Id.
309. WTO Disputes: Assistance in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings Since July 2001,
ADvisoRYCENTRE ON WTO IAw, http://www.acwl.ch/wto-disputes (last visited Feb. 5,2017).
310. The TPP Agreement does offer transition periods to select partners. Its
intellectual property chapter, for example, offers transition periods to six of the
twelve TPP partners-namely, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Peru, and Vietnam. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 18.83.4.
311. As Lim Chin Leng, Deborah Elms, and Patrick Low observed,
One of the unusual elements of the TPP is the fact that the members of the
TPP represent a range of economic development, from the world's largest
economy to a lower middle income economy. While members have been
clear that the TPP will not have any sort of "two-speed" or explicit special
and differential. . . treatment for developing country members, it is true that
the final Agreement will need to have some provisions to account for the
developmental aspects of some members.
C.L. Lim et al., What Is "High-Quality, Twenty-First Century" Anyway?, in TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP, supra note 167, at 3, 12.
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respectively. 12 As a result, Peru and Vietnam are unlikely to have the
same financial flexibility to handle investor-state disputes as the United
States and Japan. These two poorer countries are also unlikely to have
the same legal capacity to achieve success through ISDS."
2. Small-claims procedure
The second institutional improvement concerns the need for a
small-claims procedure within the ISDS mechanism. This proposal
builds on the proposal Hikan Nordstr6m and Gregory Shaffer
advanced a few years ago on the development of such a procedure
within the WTO.314 That earlier proposal sought to enable developing
countries to make greater use of the WTO dispute settlement process.
It further called for the provision of legal aid "by offering Members
312. GDP per Capita (Current USS), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
313. As Kyla Tienhaara noted,
[W]hile hiring outside counsel can be advantageous, it may not always be a
feasible option for developing countries. Large law firms often have long-
term relationships with multinational corporations and such relationships
may prevent a firm from representing a developing country in an investor-
State dispute. If a law firm is available, the next question becomes whether a
developing country can afford its services. [Eric] Gottwald notes that the
hourly rates for lawyers in elite firms can range from US$400 to US$600.
When a team of lawyers is retained for arbitral proceedings that are drawn
out over a period of several years, the result can be a colossal legal bill.
Tienhaara, supra note 132, at 612 (citing Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It
Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?,
22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 237 (2007)); see also Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 26, at 600
("[The provision of] defense attorneys ... would be particularly helpful for IP,
because their availability could correct the current imbalance between developed
and undeveloped countries in dispute resolution. Because most of the disputes are
among the developed countries that can afford to be involved in these cases, the
range of flexibilities considered are limited to those necessary to win."); Franck,
Development and Outcomes, supra note 106, at 484 ("A legal assistance center for
developing countries could provide strategic advice to enhance the quality of
arbitration and eliminate disparities in outcome related to development status.").
314. See Hikan Nordstrom & Gregory Shaffer, Access to justice in the WTO: A Case
for a Small-Claims Procedure?, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 191
(Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) (building the case for a small
claims procedure within the WTO); see also Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C.
Mavroidis, WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance, 23 WORLD EcON. 527,
536 (2000) ("Many cases that involve developing countries will generally pertain to
relatively small trade volumes. Another way of recognising resource constraints is to
consider adopting 'light' dispute settlement procedures for 'small' cases brought by
developing countries (e.g., where the exports constitute less than one per cent of
apparent consumption in the importing market).").
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legal counsel funded out of the regular WTO budget or a designated
legal aid fund."1 1 5 As Professors Nordstr6m and Shaffer explained,
What is insignificant for some Member states is highly significant to
others. A million dollars in foregone export revenue may not matter
much for the European Union or the United States; it would only be
a few seconds worth of exports. For small developing countries like
Burundi, Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau, on the other hand, $1 million
corresponds to about 1.45 percent of annual exports, or put in
relationship to national income, between 0.17 and 0.42 percent of
gross domestic product .... Forgone export revenue of this
magnitude would not be a small order for them.
What is "small" is thus a relative concept. Yet the WTO Dispute
Settlement ... system does not take into account the inherent
variation in exports across the WTO's membership. A case worth
$1 million is treated in the very same way (at least formally) as a
case worth $1 billion. The timetable is the same, the submission
requirements are the same, the standard of proof is the same, the
appeal procedures are the same; everything is the same unless the
parties opt for the alternative resolution mechanisms offered by the
[Dispute Settlement Understanding] ......
Professors Nordstr6m and Shaffer's proposal for developing a
small-claims procedure within the WTO could be used to improve the
ISDS process in the TPP or other international trade or investment
agreements. As noted earlier, the high costs of ISDS arbitrations will
not only be immensely burdensome on host states in the developing
world, but it will also virtually guarantee that most developing country
businesses will be unable to afford ISDS arbitrations-other than to
file, or threaten to file, ISDS complaints, perhaps. To avoid this
grossly unfair arrangement and the one-sided benefits that the ISDS
mechanism presently provides, establishing a small-claims procedure
within this mechanism will be quite urgent.
3. Appellate mechanism
The final institutional improvement concerns the need for an
appellate mechanism. As Cynthia Ho observed in regard to the
problems raised by a lack of such a mechanism in ISDS proceedings,
A major complaint is that the system results in inconsistent
decisions because there is no binding precedent, tribunals interpret
provisions broadly, and there is no appeal system. Although
tribunals often rely on prior decisions and awards, and counsel for
315. Nordstr6m & Shaffer, supra note 314, at 195.
316. Id. at 193.
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parties regularly cite prior decisions, the lack of hierarchy among
tribunals as compared to traditional court systems, as well as the lack
of an appellate system, may result in unpredictability. 3 17
Moreover, some commentators suggested that an appellate
mechanism could provide some important benefits to investors,
considering that they "historically have lost more often than they
have won in investor-State arbitration."' Nevertheless, only time will
tell whether the appellate mechanism, once established, will be eager
to overturn ISDS decisions as these commentators have surmised.
At the time of the TPP negotiations, the participating countries
already anticipated the future need of an appellate mechanism.
Given the language built into the TPP Agreement, the discussion of
this mechanism is inevitably different from the discussion of the first
two improvements, which the Agreement neither covers nor
anticipates. Article 9.23.11 of the TPP Agreement explicitly declares,
In the event that an appellate mechanism for reviewing awards
rendered by investor-State dispute settlement tribunals is
developed in the future under other institutional arrangements,
the Parties shall consider whether awards rendered under Article
9.29 (Awards) should be subject to that appellate mechanism. The
Parties shall strive to ensure that any such appellate mechanism
they consider adopting provides for transparency of proceedings
similar to the transparency provisions established in Article 9.24
(Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings).
The conditional language in this provision suggests that the TPP
negotiators did not oppose the introduction of an appellate
mechanism. Instead, they might have merely failed to reach a
consensus within the limited negotiation time on how this
mechanism was to be set up or whether the mechanism was needed
in the first place.12 o The proverbial door therefore remains open.
The choice of language in the TPP Agreement regarding the possible
future development of an appellate mechanism is consistent with the
317. Ho, supra note 22, at 234.
318. Barton Legum, Appellate Mechanisms for Investment Arbitration: Worth a Second
Look for the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Proposed EU-U.S. FTA?, in RESHAPING THE
ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 437, 441.
319. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.23.11 (emphasis added).
320. Compare Hans von der Burchard, EU Faces Tough Sell on TTIP Compromise,
POLITICO (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-faces-tough-sell-on-ttip-
compromise-malmstroem-froman (reporting that USTR Michael Froman
"question [ed] the need for the appeal tribunal"), with 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b) (3) (G) (iv)
(2012) (including among the U.S. principal negotiating objectives regarding foreign
investment the "provi[sion] for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide
coherence to the interpretations of investment provisions in trade agreements").
2017] 899
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ongoing negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (T-TIP), a pact that has been widely considered to be the
TPP's trans-Atlantic counterpart. 2 1  During the negotiations, the
European Commission advanced a proposal for the establishment of an
investment court system, which includes an Appeal Tribunal that
consists of two members each from the European Union, the United
States, and third countries." It remains to be seen whether the United
States will be receptive to this proposal, or even whether the Trump
administration will continue the T-TIP negotiations.
To a large extent, the proposal for developing an appellate
mechanism in the TPP Agreement is similar to the proposals that
commentators have thus far advanced, which range from the creation
of an ISDS court to the development of an appellate mechanism
similar to the WTO Appellate Body.12 1 Such an appellate mechanism
321. E.g., Hans Kundnani, TTIP Must Die So That the West Can Live, FOREIGN POL'Y
(May 13, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/13/ttip-tpp-eu-trade-obama-asia;
David Lawder, EU Trade Chief U.S. Campaign Rhetoric Won't Stop TTIP Trade Talks,
REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2016, 12:52 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-
europe-usa-idUSKCNOWCOGU.
322. See EUROPEAN UNION'S PROPOSAL FOR INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND
RESOLUTION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES § 3, art. 10.2 (2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu
/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf; see also Stephan W. Schill, The
European Commission's Proposal of an "Investment Court System" for TIP: Stepping Stone or
Stumbling Block for Multilateralizing International Investment Law , ASIL INSIGHTS (Apr.
22, 2016), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/9/european-commissions-
proposal-investment-court-system-ttip-stepping (discussing the European Commission's
proposal).
323. See Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 26, at 601 (supporting "the creation of a
central appellate body for investment disputes to address both consistency and
substantive issues, on the theory that it would have the same appreciation for IP
rationales as [Robert] Howse suggests the Appellate Body would have for public-
regarding principles"); Ho, supra note 22, at 235 ("To combat these shortcomings
there have been many proposals to reform the current system for investor-state
disputes. Many have suggested some type of appellate body to address the problem
of inconsistent as well as expansive interpretations of identical provisions.
Alternatively, some suggest replacing private arbiters with an international
investment court to promote impartiality and independence."); leva Kalnina &
Domenico Di Pietro, The Scope of ICSID Review: Remarks on Selected Problematic Issues of
ICSID Decisions, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 76, at 221, 245-46
(discussing the potential creation of an ICSID Appeals Body); Okediji, Is Intellectual
Property "Investment"?, supra note 25, at 1137 (calling for the provision of "a form of
appellate review for investor-state disputes involving intellectual property, such as the
type that exists in the WTO system or in national law"); Asif H. Qureshi, An Appellate
System in International Investment Arbitration?, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at
1154 (discussing the expediency and feasibility of having an appellate system in
international investment arbitration); Reinisch, supra note 76, at 910-11 (discussing
the need for an appellate mechanism in investment arbitration). For a collection of
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will be particularly attractive if policymakers, commentators, and civil
society organizations remain concerned about the "development
bias" 24 of ISDS arbitrators. As Susan Franck reasoned,
If outcome is linked to the development status of the presiding
arbitrator and there is disparate pressure to favor the developed
world, having standing judges with secure tenures may enhance
integrity and independence. In order to eliminate pressure to join
a club or secure repeat appointments, a standing body could
provide judicial oversight and create an environment that favors
rule of law adjudication. Moreover, such an institution could foster
the judicialization of international economic law and provide a
backstop to create certainty about contested legal issues, thereby
increasing the integrity of the dispute resolution system.
Given the wide range of proposals that experts have provided,
many models now exist to improve the TPP ISDS mechanism. One
model worth considering is the inclusion of some previous WTO
panelists or Appellate Body members in the appellate mechanism.2
Such a cross-institutional setup will not only enhance the
mechanism's quality but will further promote coherence3 2 ' and cross-
fertilization3 2 ' between the ISDS process and the WTO dispute
articles on the development of an appellate mechanism within ISDS, see generally
RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 403-505.
324. Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 106, at 451.
325. Id. at 484.
326. Other commentators have similar suggestions. See, e.g., Theodore R. Posner
& Marguerite C. Walter, The Abiding Role of State-State Engagement in the Resolution of
Investor-State Disputes, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 381, 389-91
(discussing the use of state-to-state dispute settlement to support ISDS); Andreas R.
Ziegler, Investment Law in Conflict with WT'O Law?, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT IAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 1784, 1800 ("[I]t may be useful to encourage arbitrators
and the members of judicial bodies of multilateral organizations like the WTO and
ICSID to refer to each other's case law and engage in a judicial debate. This could
avoid the scenario where each system operates in clinical isolation and would
certainly be beneficial for the development of an inter-institutional debate on special
issues affecting global trade and investment flows.").
327. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 17 (Apr. 29, 1996) (declaring
that "the General Agreement [on Tariffs and Trade] is not to be read in clinical isolation
from public international law"); RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 125, at 130 (noting that, in United States-Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, the Appellate Body "moved firmly away from the notion of the WTO
as a 'self-contained' legal regime"); Ho, supra note 22, at 247 ("[I]f investor-state
disputes could challenge TRIPS-consistent decisions, there is a risk of decisions
inconsistent with the built-in dispute resolution process of TRIPS.").
328. See SUBEDI, supra note 34, at 158 ("Foreign investment law is ... influenced by
cross-fertilisation from other areas of public international law, especially those
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settlement process. Such coherence and cross-fertilization will ensure
the healthy development of the international intellectual property
regime.' They will also be particularly important in light of the
increasing use of parallel proceedings to challenge intellectual
property and intellectual property-related regulations in developing
countries,3 30 such as those via the WTO and ISDS.331  Indeed, in
intellectual property-related investor-state disputes, ISDS arbitrators
will increasingly have to address questions concerning the extent of
protection and limitation as provided in the TRIPS Agreement.
Thus far, some commentators have already called for the exclusion
of intellectual property investments in ISDS." Although
international investment agreements generally define investment
broadly to cover all forms of investments, it is not unusual to exclude
certain unique forms of investments from ISDS. In the TPP
Agreement, for example, Article 9.3.3 states specifically that the
investment chapter "shall not apply to measures adopted or
maintained by a Party to the extent that they are covered by Chapter
11 (Financial Services) ."" If a carve-out can be created for financial
relating to human rights and environmental protection, as well as certain
fundamental principles of international economic law such as the principle of
economic self-determination of states, the right to develop, and the permanent
sovereignty of states over their natural resources.").
329. See Peter K Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1, 18 (noting the growing "focus on the
coherence of intellectual property policies, in addition to the maintenance of
balance and flexibility in those policies").
330. See Kalderimis, supra note 198, at 58 (discussing the various cases in which the
"the same dispute has triggered both WTO and arbitration procedures").
331. See discussion supra notes 13-17 (providing an example of parallel
proceedings relating to efforts to challenge the plain-packaging regulations for
tobacco products in Australia); see also Katia Yannaca-Small, Parallel Proceedings, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at 1008 (discussing parallel proceedings in
investment arbitration).
332. See, e.g., Baker & Geddes, supra note 151, at 58 (proposing "to rewrite the
[TPP] Investment Chapter to explicitly exclude IPRs and to clarify that IPRs are not
even indirectly protected by the definition of 'investment"'); Ho, supra note 22, at
255 ("Intellectual property should be excluded from investor-state arbitration
because providing enhanced protection of IP does not satisfy traditional justifications
for investment arbitrations."); Flynn, supra note 211 ("Tobacco should be carved out
of free trade agreements. But so should all other claims of 'indirect' expropriation
of expected profits of a company through health and safety regulations, including
the regulation of intellectual property. At minimum, the treating of the IP chapter
differently than all other substantive chapters (which remain subject only to state to
state adjudication) needs to be fixed.").
333. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.3.3.
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services-and, upon election, tobacco control measures 3 4-a similar
carve-out can certainly be created for intellectual property rights, at
least when there is enough political will.
Notwithstanding the possibility of creating such a carve-out, it is
worth remembering that ISDS is attractive to private investors
because it provides finality."' The more steps there are in a
process-appellate or otherwise-the longer it will take for a dispute
to be finally resolved. Ultimately, whether an appellate mechanism
should be introduced will depend on how efficiency and expedition
are to be balanced against fairness and legitimacy. Given the high
stakes involved in ISDS arbitrations and the arbitrations' controversial
nature and continuous opposition, having an appellate mechanism
built into the ISDS process to ensure greater fairness and legitimacy is
eminently sensible.
V. SILVER LININGS
The previous Part proposed a wide variety of conceptual and
institutional improvements to address the weaknesses of ISDS. Although
these improvements were created with the TPP Agreement in mind, the
analysis is equally applicable to the T-TIP Agreement or other
international trade or investment agreements containing ISDS. In fact,
the application to the latter set of agreements is particularly attractive
considering that those agreements have not yet been finalized and the
ISDS mechanism they contain can be further improved.
One question that has not yet been asked in this Article is how bad the
TPP ISDS mechanism will be if it is introduced without the improvements
334. See id. art. 29.5 (providing a carve-out for tobacco control measures). See
generally Matthew Rimmer, Plain Packaging for the Pacific Rim-Tobacco Control and the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, in TRADE LIBERALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIc PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 75 (Tania Voon ed.,
2014) (discussing tobacco control measures in relation to the TPP negotiations).
335. See Chester Brown & Kate Miles, Introduction: Evolution in Investment Treaty
Law and Arbitration, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 127, at 3, 11
("[I]nvestment arbitration has, until recently, been characterised by an approach
traditionally seen in international commercial arbitration, being that of a simple
desire for a quick and inexpensive decision to resolve the dispute."); Kalnina & Di
Pietro, supra note 323, at 245-46 ("The main disadvantages [of the creation of the
ICSID Appeals Body] include jeopardy of the principle of finality, which has always
been considered among the main advantages of arbitration over judicial
settlement. . . ."); Jaemin Lee, Introduction of an Appellate Review Mechanism for
International Investment Disputes: Expected Benefits and Remaining Tasks, in RESHAPING
THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 474, 493 ("[T]he benefit of arbitration lies in the
promptness of the proceedings; this should not be undermined for the sake of
having an appellate system.").
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proposed in this Article. More positively, given the weaknesses already
documented in Parts II and III, can there be any silver linings for this
mechanism? This Part seeks to answer this particular question, with a
focus on developing countries-countries that the current version of the
TPP ISDS mechanism will harm the most.
That ISDS has so many weaknesses and flaws certainly has made it
difficult to locate silver linings. Nevertheless, as Part III points out,
the TPP investment chapter did introduce some substantive and
procedural safeguards to help improve ISDS." Even if this improved
mechanism remains problematic for host states in the developing
world, the TPP upgrades will provide at least some benefits. This Part
discusses in turn four sets of benefits.
A. Baseline for Minimum ISDS Safeguards
The first set of benefits concerns the minimum safeguards in the
ISDS process. Just as the TPP investment chapter has ratcheted up
the standards of intellectual property protection and enforcement by
allowing private investors to use ISDS to resolve international
intellectual property disputes,3 this chapter has also raised the
baseline expectations for substantive and procedural safeguards in
the ISDS process.
Thus, if developing countries remain concerned about the
demands for ISDS in new international trade or investment
agreements, they should use the safeguards in the TPP investment
chapter as the negotiation floor. In doing so, they will be able to
demand safeguards that go beyond what the TPP Agreement
provides. They will also be able to use the TPP investment chapter as
a benchmark for the minimum safeguards that should be included in
any international trade or investment agreement containing ISDS.
Given the developing countries' difficulty in coming up with
safeguards in a vacuum, the existence of the TPP safeguards and the
related textual language is particularly useful.
B. Protection ofDeveloping Country Investments
The second set of benefits pertains to the protection of intellectual
property investments from developing countries. ISDS is likely to be
useful for not only the intellectual property rights now enshrined in
the TPP Agreement or the TRIPS Agreement but also other types of
intellectual property rights that may be recognized in the future. As
336. See discussion supra Part III.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 139-55.
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long as businesses in developing countries hold these rights, ISDS will
benefit them.
Contrary to what many have believed," ISDS does not discriminate
between the intellectual-property investments of developed countries
and those of developing countries. ISDS harms the latter group of
countries so significantly because this group does not obtain the same
range of benefits from the intellectual property system as its
developed counterpart.' ISDS merely perpetuates-and, at times,
amplifies-the inequitable intellectual property system enshrined in
the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade agreements.4 o
Interestingly, and somewhat counterintuitively, enforcement-
including enforcement through ISDS-is an area where developed
and developing countries can reach some common ground."' At the
moment, developing countries hesitate to support stronger
enforcement because they see limited benefits from such
enforcement. Their view, however, may change in the future if the
intellectual property system starts offering stronger protection to the
developing countries' intellectual property interests. Possible
benefits to these countries include greater protection of genetic
resources, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural
expressions, as well as the expansion of geographical indications to
cover such food products as Basmati rice and Darjeeling tea.s42
338. E.g., Rick Rowden, 9 Ways TPP Is Bad for Developing Countries, FOREIGN POL'Y
(July 7, 2015, 12:58 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/07/9-ways-the-tpp-is-
bad-for-developing-countries.
339. See Biadgleng, supra note 53, at 1 ("[T]he industries in developing countries
that do not have significant assets allocated in different jurisdictions do not gain a
comparable advantage from these agreements.").
340. See supra text accompanying notes 139-55.
341. See Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81
TEMP. L. REv. 433, 453 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Cultural Relics] ("[B]ecause of the
importance of enforcement in [the areas of online and offline piracy], enforcement
issues may provide a promising opportunity for both developed and less-developed
countries to cooperate."); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement: A Neglected Child in the Intellectual
Property Family, in THE INTERNET AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 279, 299 (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., 2016)
("[E]nforcement is actually one area in which developed and developing countries
can team up with each other.").
342. Cf KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
239 (2000) (noting the developing countries' demand for greater protection of
geographical indications relating to "food products that could be protected to their
advantage, such as Basmati rice and Darjeeling tea").
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In the ISDS context, the protection of traditional knowledge will
present some inevitable challenges considering that such protection
is generally introduced to address biopiracy." Instead of protecting
foreign investors against uncompensated expropriation by the host
state-a primary goal of ISDS-traditional knowledge protection
shields the host state's indigenous population from the expropriation
of indigenous materials by foreign investors. Nevertheless, if
traditional knowledge can be protected (and commodified) as
intellectual property rights and if businesses holding those rights can
have foreign investments, ISDS will allow these businesses to sue host
states in the developed world the same way it allows transnational
corporations to sue host states in the developing world.
To be sure, the above scenario is only possible when businesses
holding traditional knowledge can make foreign investments in
developed countries and when such knowledge is protected as an
intellectual property right. Nevertheless, even if this scenario fails to
materialize, ISDS does not favor the intellectual property rights of
developed countries at the expense of their developing country
counterparts. Indeed, other than privileging resourceful countries,
ISDS has been fairly neutral to disputing parties.
C. Reduced Volume of WTO Disputes
The third set of benefits relates to the reduced use of the WTO
dispute settlement process. Commentators have noted how
transnational corporations have successfully worked with developed
country governments to push for intellectual property reforms 344 as well
as successful WTO panel decisions."' However, enough evidence has
also shown that governments do not always meet the specific demands of
domestic industries4 . due partly to the overall trade picture and partly
to other political and non-political considerations."'
343. For discussions of biopiracy, see generally sources cited in Yu, Cultural Relics,
supra note 341, at 481 n.266.
344. See Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry's Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations and
Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 87, 87 (1994) (discussing the operation
of the Section 301 process and how it relates to U.S. trade negotiations).
345. See GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
IN WTO LITIGATION (2003) (discussing the partnerships between developed country
governments and transnational corporations in WTO litigation).
346. See Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 26, at 572 ("In the WTO, states decide
whether to bring a dispute to the [Dispute Settlement Body]. They may decline to
pursue a perceived injury for political or policy reasons."); Yu, From Pirates to Partners
II, supra note 88, at 923-26 (noting that the USTR initially took a "wait-and-see"
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In the trade arena, the complex decision-making process required
can be illustrated by China's creative response to the USTR's
relentless push for greater intellectual property reforms in the mid-
1990s."' Although the USTR's strong-arm tactics since the late 1980s
had resulted in the negotiation of four bilateral instruments in 1989,
1992, 1995, and 1996,"' China slowly improved its ability to respond
to U.S. pressure. In the run-up to the last negotiation in spring 1996,
Chinese Premier Li Peng went to France to sign a $1.5 billion order
for thirty short-haul Airbus planes. 50
On the surface, this purchase was irrelevant to the United States'
intellectual property demands. In reality, however, the Airbus order
completely changed the cross-industry dynamics within the USTR.
Even though the U.S. intellectual property industries claimed that
trade sanctions were badly needed to protect against a potential $2
billion loss in intellectual property-based goods and services," the
USTR was confronted with Boeing's immediate loss of $1.5 billion worth
of contracts to its European archrival (assuming that China would have
purchased those planes from Boeing). " One can only imagine how
difficult it was for the USTR to explain to Boeing executives (and
approach and refused to file a WTO complaint against China despite repeated
complaints and demands from the business community).
347. See Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 26, at 573 ("[I]nvestment arbitration is
initiated by the investor right holders. Geopolitical considerations and social welfare
are not necessarily relevant to their decisions to demand arbitration, settle disputes,
or make particular assertions.").
348. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in
the Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 131, 140-51 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From
Pirates to Partners 1] (recounting the USTR's aggressive effort toward China in the late
1980s and early 1990s).
349. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the People's Republic of China
and the United States on the Protection of Intellectual Property, May 19, 1989,
China-U.S., reprinted in PRC Agrees to Push for Copyright Law That Will Protect Computer
Software, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP., July 1989, at 151; Memorandum of
Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, China-U.S.,
T.I.A.S. No. 12036 (1995); Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb.
26, 1995, China-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 881 (1995); China Implementation of the 1995
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, June 17, 1996, China-U.S.,
http://tcc.export.gov/trade-agreements/all-tradeagreements/exp_005361.asp
(last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
350. Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 348, at 168.
351. The potential loss in the intellectual property area is likely to be much lower
than the industry's reported figures, which tend to overstate the ability or interest of
the local people to purchase protected foreign products at stated retail prices. See id.
at 175-76; WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 129 n.13 (1995).
352. Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 348, at 168.
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shareholders) why their company had to suffer to help reduce the loss
experienced by the U.S. entertainment and software industries.
Obviously, in situations where the USTR hesitates to act on the
industries' behalf, ISDS will benefit those industries by allowing them
to file complaints without governmental participation. Nevertheless,
their growing ability to file independent complaints without
government assistance or intervention may eventually backfire on
them by discouraging the government from filing WTO complaints
on their behalves in the first place. After all, governments do not
want to incur political capital if they can avoid it. Incurring such
capital will become less worthwhile if private industries can obtain
compensation themselves through ISDS.
Thus, in an unexpected way, ISDS may actually reduce the total
volume of WTO disputes targeting developing countries. That some
WTO disputes have been converted to ISDS disputes does not, in and
of itself, become a benefit. Nevertheless, there are serious benefits to
avoiding WTO disputes with developed country governments, such as
the European Union or the United States. Being sued by Philip Morris
is just not the same as being sued by the U.S. government, not to
mention that states have historically won about sixty percent of those
ISDS cases involving the final resolution of the underlying disputes. 353
D. Benefits to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
The last set of benefits involves small and medium-sized enterprises
("SMEs"). Although the analysis of SMEs is highly important
considering that many businesses in developing countries are SMEs,
this analysis can go either way, and the benefits are somewhat unclear.
Commentators have widely debated the benefits of ISDS to SMEs. As
the USTR declared in its fact sheet, "ISDS can be of particular benefit to
[SMEs], which often lack the resources or expertise to navigate foreign
legal systems and seek redress for injury at the hands of a foreign
government. Indeed, SMEs and individuals have accounted for about
half of all cases brought under international arbitration."' Similarly,
the Center for Strategic and International Studies stated in its report,
353. See Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 106, at 447 ("[G] overnments
(57.7%) were more likely than investors (38.5%) to win cases and have no damages
awarded for alleged treaty breaches."); Franck, Using Investor-State Mediation Rules,
supra note 116, at 79 ("[T]he 144 publicly available awards (up to January 2012)
where arbitrators ended up resolving a treaty dispute included 57 investor wins
(where investors were awarded some form of damages) and 87 State wins (where
States suffered US$0 in a liability finding).").
354. ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36.
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" [i] n the 105 disputes filed at ICSID by American investors, two-thirds of
the participants in the arbitrations were individuals or SMEs [defined as
business entities with fewer than 500 employees].""' Despite these
numbers, the high arbitration costs have led one to wonder what type of
SME these statistics actually cover. Were the covered SMEs mostly from
developed countries? Developed and emerging countries? Or
developed, emerging, and developing countries?
Although ISDS may benefit SMEs in developed countries as well as
those in China, India, and other large developing countries, it is very
likely that the high arbitration costs will put SMEs in smaller
developing countries at a significant disadvantage... or even prevent
them from filing ISDS complaints against their host states in the first
place. Thus, it remains to be seen how beneficial ISDS will be to
businesses in developing countries.
CONCLUSION
Although developing country policymakers, academic and policy
commentators, and civil society organizations continue to strongly oppose
the use of investment law in the intellectual property arena, it seems
inevitable that such law will be used to resolve international intellectual
property disputes. After all, many industries and their supportive
governments have already viewed intellectual property protection through
an investment lens. Thus, it will be only a matter of time before the
investment-related aspects of intellectual property rights are emphasized
to the same extent as the trade-related aspects of these rights.
Nevertheless, implementing the type of ISDS mechanism provided
by the TPP Agreement is not a foregone conclusion. Even with the
various substantive and procedural safeguards that the TPP
Agreement has instituted to improve ISDS, the mechanism remains
flawed. This Article therefore proposes both conceptual and
institutional improvements to address these flaws.
Some readers will undoubtedly be more optimistic about the
developing countries' prospects for resisting the use of ISDS in the
intellectual property field. If they are right, the harm that ISDS
generates will not materialize-or will, at least, be significantly
355. MILLER & HICKS, supra note 31, at 10.
356. Gus Van Harten & Pavel Malysheuski, Who Has Benefited Financially from
Investment Treaty Arbitration? An Evaluation of the Size and Wealth of Claimants 12
(Osgoode Hall Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.
14, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2713876 ("ISDS appears to have created among
smaller and unknown investors a small number of lucky winners and a much larger
number of apparent losers.").
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curtailed. Regardless, it will be important to start thinking more
deeply about the investment-related aspects of intellectual property
rights. After all, policymakers, commentators, and civil society
organizations are unlikely to propose solutions to improve ISDS if
they just focus on how to keep ISDS outside the intellectual property
field. By the time they realize that the mechanism cannot be kept
outside the field, it will just be too late to start studying the
investment-related aspects of intellectual property rights.
The arrival of the TRIPS Agreement and the application of trade
rules to the intellectual property field have woken up many
commentators and civil society organizations."' The TPP Agreement
and other TRIPS-plus trade or investment agreements containing
ISDS are likely to do the same. Thus, it is high time we started
preparing for the growing use of investment law in the intellectual
property field. Greater preparation and engagement in this area will
help us improve ISDS while enhancing our understanding of this
highly controversial mechanism. For those who want to keep ISDS
outside the intellectual property field, a deepened understanding will
also strengthen our ability to resist the use of investment law in the
intellectual property field.
357. See SELL, supra note 47, at 181 ("When I asked some public-regarding
copyright activists 'where they had been' during TRIPS, they told me they had been
'sleeping' but that because of TRIPS they had 'woken up."'); Ellen 't Hoen, The Revised
Drug Strategy: Access to Essential Medicines, Intellectual Prperty, and the World Health
Organization, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 127,
131 (Gaelle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) (stating that it was at the
International Conference on National Medicinal Drug Policies in Sydney in 1995
that "for the first time public-health advocates raised the concern that the
globalization of new international trade rules and the harmonization of regulatory
requirements would restrict countries' ability to implement drug policies that would
ensure access to medicine for all"); Keith E. Maskus, The WIPO Development Agenda: A
Cautionary Note, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 163, 164 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2008) ("Policymakers,
non-governmental organizations, the media, and even many legal scholars have
awakened to the fact that IP regulations have rather fundamental implications for
the processes of economic development.").
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